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Abstract 
 
Offshore installations are complex and need to be maintained properly to keep expected 
performance. Critical failures on these installations might induce great threats on 
productivity, personnel safety, and environment. A maintenance strategy that combines 
corrective, preventive and predictive maintenance practices will be suggested to achieve 
reliability as well as cost-efficiency. During the operation and maintenance (O&M) activities, 
much data is collected, and it has great potential values to help understanding the condition of 
offshore facilities, and to help making reliable decisions. 
The thesis is designed to suggest maintenance decision-making practices that incorporate all 
data collected, analyzed and accumulated from O&M activities, failure histories and other 
data sources. The methodology used in the thesis is suggested by the author. Drawworks is 
selected as an example to explain the idea of achieving the target. 
The research will start from identification of the most critical failure modes of drawworks. 
This will be done in several ways at the same time to ensure most failure modes are included 
in the discussion. Then qualitative (Fault tree analysis) and quantitative analysis (reliability 
analysis, assignment of Monitoring Priority Number) will be implemented. The results from 
these analyses will provide some reference of risk criticality of potential failures. With the 
risk analysis results and data integrity management, comprehensive and straightforward data 
architecture could be built in purpose of providing the right data to the right person at the 
right place. In technical integrity management context, competence management, decision 
support system and integrated work process will also be studied to help identifying necessary 
and critical elements in a reliable and efficient decision making practice on maintenance 
notificaitons. 
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Part 1 Introduction of thesis 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Offshore installations are complex and need to be maintained properly to keep expected 
performance. Critical failures on these installations might induce great threats on 
productivity, personnel safety, and environment (Norsok Z-008 2011). According to data 
from IHS energy (IHS 2015), average day rate in northwest Europe for jack-up is about 
150,000 USD in February 2015. To keep operation efficiency and maintain reliability are to 
save cost. Currently, preventive and corrective maintenance on offshore installations are 
widely used in purpose of reducing downtime and increasing reliability, while predictive 
maintenance based on condition monitoring (hereafter CM) technologies is becoming more 
and more popular.  
To ensure reliability of offshore installations, there is an increasing need of incorporating 
data from CM technologies as well as other data sources into decision-making procedure in 
maintenance scope. The case studied in this master thesis is a company operating on the 
southwest of Stavanger in North Sea.  
1.2 Challenges  
Which parameters should be monitored? 
Condition monitoring demands investment on resources like money and personnel. It is 
costly and is thus recommended to be utilized with proof of profitability/efficiency. What’s 
more, not every component needs to be monitored, and some of them can be difficult to 
monitor due to space limitation and so on. All of these require that a methodology of 
identifying critical monitoring parameters needs to be designed and should be reliable and 
convincible.  
What data needs to be collected and how could it be used in decision-making process? 
Plenty of data from various sources is saved during operation and maintenance activities. It 
becomes almost impossible for even specialists to decide where to start with and which to 
use. Under present decision-making structure, data needed for different disciplines is not 
clearly defined/classified or properly analyzed, and this normally ends up with some very 
sketchy analysis done by decision-makers. How to define the right data for the right person 
needs to be discussed in the thesis.  
Normally, catastrophic systematic failures do not happen in one second, as there is always 
some time and several stages for them to propagate. How to identify the stage of propagation 
as well as its corresponding data sets, the competence of people in charge, and how to make 
decision based on relative data need to be discussed. Through the utilization of risk analysis 
tools and company practice, decision-making related data would be identified and structured. 
Decision-making process is suggested to be redesigned to combine data architecture and risk-
based failure analysis (both qualitative and quantitative). 
! -11- 
1.3 Scope definition of the thesis 
The research objective in the thesis is set to suggest some ideas of data-driven decision-
making practices on maintenance notifications. Data management, competence management 
and work process management will be discussed in purpose of providing more robust and 
reliable decision making practice. Drawworks will be used as the example to illustrate the 
research methodology. 
The criticality of maintaining drawworks will be discussed both qualitatively (FMEA, FTA, 
company practice) and quantitatively (reliability analysis with Birnbaums’s importance 
measure). In this thesis, both structures and control system will be discussed. Condition 
monitoring data will not be analyzed or diagnosed here in this project, but classification of 
data will be done to classify the most critical data that is needed for decision-making. A data 
management architecture will be developed with help of risk analysis, reliability analysis and 
data integrity principles. The data-driven decision making practice will be suggested. 
To implement the research, failure modes identification will be studied firstly to have an 
overall risk picture of the equipment. Secondly, through failure cause analysis, the parameters 
that need to be monitored could be identified and relative CM techniques could be 
recommended. At last, present decision-making structures on maintenance notifications will 
be studied and then improved with utilization of relative data as well as competence 
management and decision support system. Besides, some figures derived from the FMEA 
could be used to indicate the maintenance priority of drawworks to help decision-making. 
1.4 Main goals of the thesis 
The thesis is aimed to suggest some ideas to decision-making practice with utilization of 
necessary data with response to maintenance notifications. Wider technical integration on 
data management, competence management and decision support system will be combined 
into maintenance decision-making process. With this work done, the company could 
hopefully achieve: 
1) Better understanding of interrelationship between facility condition (every critical 
parameter) and failure mechanisms; 
2) Increased reliability and reduced risk for offshore operation; 
3) Continuous improvement of maintenance decision-making practice; 
4) Data-driven decision making practice on maintenance notifications; 
1.5 Main deliverables 
The thesis is oriented with an intension from the company to classify and utilize CM data 
from drawwork system on maintenance decision-making. The scope is latterly widened to 
suggest a data-driven decision-making processes on maintenance notifications after 
discussion with company and faculty supervisor from the university. With the analysis made 
in the research, the author hopes the methodology used in this research could suggest some 
fresh ideas to the whole O&G industry to help make more robust decisions in response with 
notifications and maintenance refinements. The main deliverables include: 
1) The most critical failure modes of drawworks; 
2) Methods to identify which parameter/component should be monitored; 
3) Methods to implement technical integrity management in a systematic and practical 
way; 
! -12- 
4) Method of combining data management into decision making process in response 
with maintenance notifications; 
Besides, the research is supposed to be a template for decision-making practice on 
maintenance notificaitons, which could be duplicated on other critical equipment/ system. 
The basics of the template include: FMEA report, FTA analysis, and data management 
system, decision support system, etc.  
1.6 Methodology  
The case study part in this research is based on real case. Technical drawings on drawworks 
are available and will be used as the basis for relative risk analysis. Referring to specific 
equipment, basic risk analysis reports are normally provided by vendors, for instance the 
FMEA report. In this research, FMEA report is developed by the author due to the absence of 
the original FMEA report.  
Critical failure modes could be identified by three ways: company practice, literature review, 
and FMEA. Risk analysis approach like FMEA could provide a systematic view of potential 
failure modes and causes. Study on company’s failure data and maintenance histories gives 
an insight from company’s practices. And literature review on failure modes of drawworks 
helps to build a full risk picture of the equipment. 
FTA will then be implemented based on all critical failure modes (as basic events of FTA). It 
helps to identify the most critical parameters that need to be monitored. The results from fault 
tree analysis are used to build up the data architecture and used as part of decision support 
system. With elaboration of competence management, a comprehensive data-driven decision-
making practice on maintenance notifications is suggested. The research path could be seen 
in Figure 1. 
During the research work of FMEA, FTA and decision-making practices, some interviews 
with experts from DNV-GL as well as the company are done. These give the author the 
insight from both operator and third party consultancy company, so that a full picture of 
problem could be generated. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Methodology of research 
Referring to the outline o›f the thesis, there are four major parts, which are introduction, 
theory descriptions, case study, and discussion & conclusion. The first part of the thesis is 
introduction of current challenge and requirements of maintaining critical systems like 
drawworks in offshore drilling rig. And the main goal, methodology of research and 
challenges are explained in this part. The second part will focus on the introduction and 
explanation of theories that will be mentioned in case study part of the thesis. As shown 
above in Figure 1, the case study will be elaborated in three chapters, chapter 3, 4 and 5. 
Identification of 
failure modes 
FTA 
(quantitative) 
data-driven 
maintenance 
decision making 
FMSA, literature review 
&Company Practice 
Wider range of technical integrity 
• Data architecture 
• Failure analysis 
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Discussion about the methodology reliability and certification, research results and 
contributions, learning outcomes and future scope of work will be done in chapter 6. Finally, 
a conclusion of the work will be drawn in chapter 7.  
1.7 Assumptions and limitations  
The research is conducted with several restrictions. There are also some assumptions that are 
supposed to make the research reasonably easier, and some limitations due to capability and 
reach of resources. As stated by Simon, confusion is quite common when things come to 
what are the differences among assumptions, and limitations in conducting research. (Marilyn 
Simon, 2011) 
Assumptions made in the thesis: 
1) Assume condition monitoring techniques are cost-efficient to be used on the 
equipment the author picks during the research; 
2) Information on failure records and other relative documents or information the 
company are assumed to be right within acceptable range of deviation, and the 
analysis developed from these information is therefore reasonable and acceptable; 
3) Reliability data from OREDA is assumed to be reliable; 
Limitations in the thesis: 
1) Due to time limit and scope of master thesis, the discussion of decision-making 
process on maintenance notifications is implemented is implemented by using 
drawworks as the example. The decision-making process might be different for the 
overall system from drawworks; 
2) Due to the author’s competence from his master program, when topic goes to 
technical integrity concept, the thesis does not focus on design and operation part. 
Mainly technological aspects are discussed;  
3) The availability and amount of literature is limited; 
4) Not all reliability data could be found in OREDA or other literature. This means the 
quantitative reliability analysis could not be done on the overall system; 
5) Data used in this thesis is limited inside Norwegian oil and gas industry; 
6) The methodology adopted in the thesis is tailor-made for the company case, and thus 
is recommended to adapt the method accordingly to match different conditions for 
different equipment/companies; 
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Part 2 Theory descriptions 
In this part, all the theories and principles that are relative to the research will be explained 
and disscussed. And they will be the basis for the case study which will be illustrated later in 
part 3. 
 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Hoisting system on drilling rig 
Hoisting system is one of the key systems on 
drilling rig. As described by Baker (Baker 1998), 
hoisting system consists of drawworks, derrick, 
crown block, traveling block, and drilling line 
(Figure!2). The drilling line is spooled in the drum 
of the drawworks. The drilling line go through 
several pulleys in the crown block and then 
connected to the travelling block. As drilling line in 
this section runs fast and accordingly wears easily, 
the line is normally spooled for 4 to 6 times 
between the pulleys on crown block and travelling 
block. Drilling strings or casings are connected to 
the hook on the bottom of traveling block. The 
drilling line then runs to the dead end anchor with 
force sensor stretching on the line (Gusman & 
Porozhskogo 2002). Derrick provides the support to 
the drawworks, crown block and traveling block. 
Through the power from electrical motors, 
drawworks could achieve the hoisting functions 
by rolling in or out the drilling line.  
2.1.1 Drawworks system description 
Drawworks is the key component in hoisting system. It is an essential part during the drilling 
operation. It is supposed to perform five essential functions, which are:  
1) Exert a pull on the drilling line, and through the blocks and other suspension 
equipment drag the drill string or casing out of the hole;   
2) Control of speed of lowering the drill string or casing down to the hole with braking 
system; 
3) Through braking system, drawworks could limit and control the weight that is applied 
on the bit; 
4) Provide a power takeoff for chain driven rotary table if no other hoist equipment is 
installed; 
Figure'2'The'hoisting'system'(Ron'Baker'1996) 
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5) Catshaft is mounted on with catheads, which provide numerous rig floor lifting 
services (optional).  
According to Baker (Baker 1998), a typical drawwork is consisted of seven major systems 
(Figure! 3, cathead is excluded as the drawwork in this case does not have cathead). This 
breakdown is beneficial to the further analysis about condition monitoring execution on 
various components of drawworks. 
The systems include:  
1) Hoisting drum assembly, 
which is the key component 
of the drawworks; 
2) Braking system, including 
mechanical brakes and 
emergency electromagnetic 
brakes, provides redundant 
braking insurance during 
hoisting and loading operation; 
3) Electric motors and power 
transmission system, which 
produce, transmit and distribute power; 
4) Control system, including driller’s control system (DCS) like motion reference unit 
(MRU) and human-machine interface, and drawworks’s control system like alarms, 
transducers, valves and other control units; 
5) Lubrication system, including grease, oil spray, sealed transmission, and compulsory 
lubrication; 
6) Supporting system, including frames, case and seat. 
In point of power driven methods, there are hydraulic motor driven, DC motor driven and AC 
motor driven drawworks. For electric system as DC motor or AC motor driven drawworks, 
the average efficiency is 15%-20% higher than hydraulic system (Rium Tapjan and Hege 
Kverneland 2010). DC motor driven drawworks is known for its high capacity and efficiency 
of hoisting, and also vast volume and heavy weight. And the structure is more complicated 
compared to AC motor driven. AC motor driven drawworks has become more and more 
popular due to its simpler structure, relatively smaller footprint and increasing hoisting 
capacity. However, to achieve the same hoisting capacity as DC motor does, higher power 
AC motor is normally needed.  
Referring to transmission mechanism, there are chain driven and gear driven drawworks. 
Chain driven needs higher precision of installation during manufacturing and has relatively 
low transmission efficiency. It also needs to be clutch-shifted quite a lot during operation. 
Chain or gear is connected to the motor to transmit power to the drum shaft through opening/ 
closing the clutch. It needs to be adjusted properly and lubricated with right oil. 
The control of hoisting/loading speed is achieved with assistance of motors and brakes. The 
drawworks is supposed to be able to hoist as much as 300 tons weight (Baker 1998), and 
should be able to stop and hold the load at any point during loading (Dreco drawworks 
manuel). The clutch is designed to be open when loading operation is in place and 
programmable (with PLC) braking system works to control the loading speed. The braking 
energy is transferred into heat and absorbed by resistor located with the AC drive panels. The 
brake discs are air-cooled which allows a high rate of energy absorption. There are usually 
Figure'3'Typical'arrangement'of'drawworks'(Baker'1998)'
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two independent braking systems, mechanical and electromagnetic (Figure 4). The mechanical 
brake works as main brake. The emergency braking system is connected to PLC main brake 
with spring. Once power or pressure fails, the emergency brake will be triggered and the 
brake calipers are activated. 
 
Figure 4 Layout of drawworks (Mortensen,1984) 
2.1.2 Current maintenance practices for drawworks 
Drawworks is one of the most critical machinery during drilling operation. The drawworks, 
as described in chapter 2.1.1, mainly include six systems. The current maintenance practices 
on drawworks will be discussed in the following. Generally, based on each company’s risk 
matrix or risk analysis results, corrective maintenance is preferred to be implemented on 
component/sub-system that has slight influence on productivity or total cost. For critical 
component/sub-system, which failure might induce downtime or accident, is preferably 
monitored periodically or by condition. 
1) Hoisting drum shaft assembly: 
For rotary machine, the industry tends to adopt condition-monitoring techniques to monitor 
parameters like vibration, proximity, torque and temperature. Referring to the drawworks 
drum assembly, the external Groove (mounted on drum for better seating wire lines) is 
normally set to be examined regularly and replace periodically. It is in scope of preventive 
maintenance. The replacement is relatively flexible. The arrangement of this kind of 
preventive maintenance is recommended to merge with other major maintenance activities to 
reduce the interruption of production.  
For the shaft assembly, predictive maintenance (PdM) is widely utilized. Maintenance targets 
normally include lubrication oil, bearing, shaft wearing and alignment, temperature, etc. The 
monitoring of these parameters has been proved with great benefits on reliability, safety and 
cost efficiency. The monitoring could be periodically or continuous. Condition monitoring 
techniques are normally conducted independently, and could diagnose about 30%-40% of all 
faults usually (Hunt 1996, Newell 1999, Anderson 1982). However, recent research indicates 
more accurate and reliable information could be gained with the combination of different 
condition monitoring techniques (Mathew, Stecki 1987, Maxwell, Johnson 1997, Troyer 
1999). Oil debris analysis (periodically collected) could be an essential method to examine 
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the condition of shaft assembly. The size and origin of debris from oil analysis could indicate 
the condition of bearing, shaft and lubrication oil. With the help of vibration, proximity and 
temperature transducers, the maintenance needs could be evaluated and identified.  
2) Braking system 
Braking system is always designed with redundancy (called as emergency braking system), 
while the engagement of emergency braking system also means unexpected downtime. 
Braking system is so critical for safe operation and thus is normally recommended to use 
PdM and PM to improve reliability. Pneumatic control system is relatively easy to 
incorporate parameter monitoring sensors, like pressure, temperature and flow rate detector. 
Visual inspections could be coped with these techniques to help eliminate undetected failure 
symptoms. Besides visual inspection, acoustic detector could also be used as predictive 
condition monitoring tools to indicate possible failure in a relatively general way. Actually, 
noise and vibration are the most recognizable and obvious indications of failure for 
pneumatic system.  
Braking disc and band are not redundant as braking system is. The control of engaging or 
opening braking disc might function perfectly, while the failure of braking disc/bands will 
still end up with failure of braking. Preventive replacement of braking bands periodically is 
recommended for higher reliability of the whole system. Air-gap between braking disc and 
band need to be examined and adjusted as part of preventive maintenance program.  
3) Electric motors and power transmission system 
Due to the complexity and criticality of motors, maintenance programs on motors are often 
set with priority of preventive/predictive maintenance. Corrective maintenance is still 
acceptable due to redundancy design principle. However, the risk of total failure in case of 
losing one of the redundant motors will be high. As Benbouzid explains, motor-driven 
equipment often provides the key capabilities that are essential to business success and to 
safety of equipment and personnel (Benbouzid 2000). Preventive and predictive maintenance 
programs are seemingly more preferable from the industry on motors. Many commercially 
available techniques and tools to monitor motors to improve reliability could be utilized 
currently. Variety of sensors are now used on monitoring failure symptoms of motor, like air-
gap, voltage and current of stator, output torque, vibration, internal and external temperature, 
and so on.  
For chain driven transmission system, noise and lubrication oil (discussed later) is often set as 
the monitoring parameter in maintenance programs. Excessive noise during operation might 
indicate a too large chain pitch, sprockets misalignment, excessive chain slack, or loose shaft 
mounts. Ignorance of uncommon noise may gradually lead to failure of chain/ sprockets 
parts, which plays a critical role in transmission system. The loss of any of them will 
definitely cause failure of the whole system. Preventive maintenance is often chosen on 
transmission system. Wearing of thickness of link-plate, if beyond 5% (API 2003), or 
wearing of sprocket tooth thickness, if beyond 10%, will lead to misalignment of sprocket. 
The sprockets need to be replaced immediately to avoid its impact on the whole system.  
Mid-span movement of chain should be within tabulated limit (for example Table 1). 
Adjustment needs to be made on center distance to obtain desired amount of slack. Normally 
2 pitches are removed if elongation (Figure 5) exceed the adjustment limit and wear 
elongation length does not exceed 3% or the functional limit (API 2003). If necessary, 1 pitch 
replacement is allowed and offset link might be used instead.  
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Figure 5 Wear diagram (Diamond chain)  
 
Table 1 Mid-span Movement (Diamond chain)  
 
4) Control system 
As described above, control system including driller’s control system (DCS) as motion 
reference unit (MRU) and human-machine interface, and drawworks’s control system as 
alarms, transducers, valves and other control system. Maintaining of these control system 
involves both software verification and updating, and physical control units maintenance. For 
management software and operating system HMI, software providers normally provide 
updating or patching service due to adding of function or modification of possible failure. 
The updating of software could be either corrective or preventive when tailor-designed 
function features need to be incorporated into present system. For transducers, fail-safe 
modes are required in most situations. The failure of sensors is detectable through HMI 
reading, and its failure will put no impact on other part of the system. Sometimes, self-testing 
is even incorporated in some sensors, while it is not widely utilized due to cost consideration. 
Corrective maintenance could thus be used on control units like transducers as well as alarms. 
For valves, calipers and other critical control units, the failure of them normally induces the 
failure of certain control system. Referring to specific control system, criticality of 
consequence varies. In general, failure of control system is less visible and more difficult to 
be identified when it comes to failure, which means longer time of downtime. Oil analysis, 
acoustic detection, or visual inspection could be used in a combined way to reveal failures as 
part of PdM program.  
5) Lubrication system 
Lubrication system itself is not the kind of system, which failure will bring in total systematic 
failure immediately. Anyway, it is one of the most important systems to drawworks. Rotary 
shafts, bearing, chains and sprockets all need adequate lubrication to keep operation 
efficiency. As mentioned above, oil debris analysis, as part of periodic PdM program, could 
be used to reveal the property of lube oil, size and origin of debris, or overheat condition. As 
stated by Ehlert, lube oil sampling (collected when in use) is never a one-time event (Ehlert 
2013), and should be done in a certain period with consideration of failure rate bathtub curve 
especially when new component/equipment is brought into use. Besides the regular on-site 
inspection, purification and cleaning of lubrication oil should also be developed and 
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implemented (Ehlert 2013). For physical part of lubrication system, visual inspection is 
normally done periodically to ensure the functionality of, for instance, oil spray holes, oil 
reservoir tank integrity, etc. Beside lube oil, lubrication pump (electric motor driven) is the 
essential component of the whole system. It is normally designed with no redundancy. 
Pressure and flow rate transducers could be used to monitor the working condition or the 
pump. According to Cummings bridgeway’s presentation on pump maintenance (Trombly 
2015), for instance, preventive maintenance program could be conducted on pumps weekly, 
monthly, semiannually, or annually.  
Table 2 Preventive maintenance on pumps (Adapted from Trombly 2015) 
Weekly Monthly Semiannually Annually 
• Record 
suction/discharge 
gauge readings 
• Record elapsed time 
meter readings 
• Record amp readings 
if possible 
• Exercise valves 
 
• Check impeller 
clearance if applicable 
• Check oil levels in 
seal and motor 
housing 
 
• Change oil in seal 
and motor housing if 
applicable 
• Test alarms for 
proper operation 
• Perform basic 
electrical tests 
 
6) Supporting system 
Preventive maintenance program is normally conducted on supporting system. 
Annual/periodical verification from third party classification society usually covers NDT on 
major structure/case to ensure integrity and safety besides the visual inspection by operators. 
Fatigue cracks or corrosion could be identified and assessed for sake of safe operation. For 
drawworks, the NDT test could only be done onshore due to testing equipment limitation. 
During the time, it is recommended that other maintenance or upgrading work could be done 
simultaneously.  
2.2 Overview of maintenance concepts 
2.2.1 Common maintenance practices 
In dictionary, maintenance is defined as “the work of keeping something in proper 
condition”. In the modern world as today, the efficient running of the society depends on the 
smooth operation of many complex systems. All equipment is unreliable in a sense that it 
degrades with ageing, and fails when it no longer has capacity to deliver required services or 
products (Kobbacy and D.N.P. Murthy 2008). The consequences of failure of any critical 
system could be dramatic. This might immediately bring in great threat on human safety, 
environment damage, and economic efficiency. In this sense, maintenance is introduced to 
ensure equipment and systems running efficiently for their designed life at least. According 
to Markeset (Markeset 2012), there are different aspects of maintenance, including safety-
enhancing aspects of maintenance, performance enhancing aspects, economical aspects, 
quality enhancing aspects, environmental aspects, life span increasing aspects, and aesthetic 
aspects. There are mainly four kinds of maintenance programs in use, which are corrective 
maintenance, preventive maintenance and predictive maintenance.  
Failure develops as time increases, shown in Figure 6. Different maintenance approach starts 
from different stage of the curve. According to NASA’s, corrective maintenance still 
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accounts for more than 55% of maintenance resources. Preventive maintenance and 
predictive maintenance accounts for 31% and 12% separately. Other maintenance programs 
account for 2% (NASA 2000). 
 
Figure 6 Failure development process (Markeset 2012) 
2.2.1.1 Corrective maintenance 
As years ago, corrective maintenance is adopted as the main solution to restore failed systems. 
The procedure is also called ‘operate to failure’. Nothing is done until failure happens. This 
kind of failure tends to make maintenance a headache and emergency, which requires 
immediate investment of time, labor force and money. At that time, failure was supposed to 
be inevitable and was not treated as part of value creation procedure. By implementing 
corrective maintenance plan, no human labor or capital is invested into the project until it 
fails. This looks like money and labor force have been saved, while more money may be 
spent afterwards due to serial failure caused by the first one. Besides, unplanned downtime 
would be very costly. In addition of the emergency condition of such failure, more than 
needed labor may be involved in purpose of improving maintenance efficiency. Overtime 
working could barely be avoided, which in return induce more cost on labor force.  
Table 3 Pros and cons of corrective maintenance (DOE 2010) 
Pros Cons 
• Low cost 
• Less staff 
• Increased cost due to unplanned 
downtime of equipment. 
• Increased labor cost, especially if 
overtime is needed. 
• Cost involved with repair or 
replacement of equipment. 
• Possible secondary equipment or 
process damage from 
• Equipment failure. 
• Inefficient use of staff resources. 
 
2.2.1.2 Preventive maintenance 
The program sometimes is called time-based preventive maintenance. The approach of doing 
maintenance has changed a lot over the past few years. In order to avoid costly corrective 
maintenance, some preventive maintenance approaches are developed gradually. By saying 
so, these maintenance activities occur before the total failure of equipment/system. With the 
increasing of complexity of equipment, failures may easily happen during early use due to 
inadequate coupling, wrong operation, insufficient lubrication and so on. As time moves on, 
failure rate decreases and keeps stable for a long period hopefully. As wearing becomes 
obvious, failure rate increases again. This could be seen in famous bathtub failure curve in 
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Figure 7. Preventive maintenance plan could be developed based on the indication from 
bathtub curve, and better safe operation of systems/ equipment could be achieved. According 
to NASA’s report, in addition to an increased reliability as a result of using preventive 
maintenance program, 12% to 18% savings could be achieved compared to corrective 
maintenance plan (NASA 2000).  
 
Figure 7 Bathtub failure curve 
Table 4 Pros and cons of preventive maintenance (DOE 2010) 
Pros Cons 
• Cost effective in many capital-
intensive processes. 
• Flexibility allows for the adjustment 
of maintenance periodicity. 
• Increased component life cycle. 
• Energy savings. 
• Reduced equipment or process 
failure. 
• Estimated 12% to 18% cost savings 
over corrective maintenance program. 
• Catastrophic failures still likely to 
occur. 
• Labor intensive. 
• Includes performance of unneeded 
maintenance. 
• Potential for incidental damage to 
components in conducting unneeded 
maintenance. 
 
2.2.1.3 Predictive maintenance 
Predictive maintenance is also called condition-based preventive maintenance. Condition 
monitoring, as an important part of it, is the process of monitoring the performance of a 
parameter (vibration, temperature, oil debris, etc.) of equipment, in order to identify a 
significant change, which is indicative of a developing fault. Condition could be monitored in 
subjective, objective or continuous way. Other than subjective observations, with the 
development of modern condition monitoring technique, performance could be monitored 
and measured in a systematical way to give indication of whole health condition of the 
equipment/system. With one or more indicators (according to operator’s risk criteria 
acceptance) showing the trend of failure or deterioration of the component, maintenance need 
is suggested to be assessed and performed if necessary.  
Some widely used condition monitoring techniques in industries include: vibration 
monitoring, process parameter monitoring, thermodynamic, thermography, tribology, 
lubrication oil analysis, and visual inspection. As development of sensor technology, 
conditions could be monitored through different kinds of pre-installed instrumentations or 
handed in places that are of interest. Real-time data will be recorded and sampled for further 
analysis. To design a monitoring system, the most critical aspect is to determine which 
parameter to monitor and how it is monitored. A typical condition-monitoring program could 
be implemented through following steps according to Markeset (Markeset 2012), shown in 
Figure 8. 
! -22- 
 
Figure 8 Condition Monitoring Methodology (Markeset 2012) 
Table 5 Pros and cons of predictive maintenance (DOE 2010) 
Pros Cons 
• Increased component operational 
life/availability. 
• Allows for preemptive corrective 
actions. 
• Decrease in equipment or process 
downtime. 
• Decrease in costs for parts 
• Improved worker and environmental 
safety. 
• Estimated 8% to 12% cost savings 
over preventive 
• Increased investment in diagnostic 
equipment. 
• Increased investment in staff training. 
• Savings potential not readily seen by 
management. 
The main objective of the predictive maintenance is to predict failures at an earlier stage so 
that maintenance activities could be planned to take place at a time convenient to 
management and to minimize unplanned interruption of the operation system. Real-time data 
is collected and analyzed to prioritize the maintenance resources. However, to finish such 
kind of work, highly skilled workers are needed in position to implement the work; more 
equipment is introduced into the system, which increases maintenance need of more 
equipment unexpectedly; and unplanned maintenance may be increased due to potential 
serious failure indications analyzed from condition monitoring data. This is not to say that 
without doing this corrective maintenance will be less costly. It is always advised to assess 
the value and cost efficiency before implementing predictive maintenance.  
 
2.2.2 Reliability centered maintenance strategy 
Every time a maintenance plan is put into practice, there is no differentiation of the criticality 
for various equipment/ components from preventive maintenance and predictive maintenance 
program. If preventive maintenance and predictive maintenance program should be done on 
every failure potential with the same weight of consequence, it will be very costly and brings 
unnecessary downtime of production due to maintenance activities. RCM is defined as ‘a 
process used to determine the maintenance requirements of any physical asset in its operating 
context’ (Moubray 1997). Unlike other maintenance programs, RCM does not consider 
different equipment to have equal importance on either the process or facility safety. By 
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doing this, unlike preventive or predictive maintenance plan, RCM actually admits the 
limitation of personnel and financial resources, and the use of both needs to be prioritized and 
optimized. RCM relies on predictive maintenance and corrective maintenance due to need of 
monitoring condition and optimizing maintenance resources. Some inexpensive and 
unimportant equipment would be preferably left to corrective maintenance.  
As stated in IEC, RCM is considered to be a method of creating an comprehensive overview 
of the equipment, and developing the most appropriate maintenance approach to achieve 
availability, reliability, safety, productivity and cost-efficiency (IEC 60300-3 2011). To gain 
cost-efficiency is the key challenge during execution of RCM strategy, cost and maintenance 
level need to be balanced properly, as shown in Figure 9 (Holme 2006). 
 
Figure 9 Operational cost on different maintenance level (Holme 2006) 
The arrangement of different maintenance policies on different equipment/ components 
recommended by NASA is shown in Table 6 (NASA 2000):  
Table 6 Reliability centered maintenance element applications (DOE 2010) 
Reliability Centered Maintenance Hierarchy 
Reactive Element 
Applications 
Preventive Element 
Applications 
Predictive Element 
Applications 
Small parts and equipment Equipment subject to wear Equipment with random 
failure patterns 
Non-critical equipment Consumable equipment Critical equipment 
Equipment unlikely to fail Equipment with known 
failure patterns 
Equipment not subject to 
wear 
Redundant systems Manufacturer 
recommendations 
Systems which failure may 
be induced by incorrect 
preventive maintenance 
RCM process could be arranged as shown in Figure 10. It typically follows a route of 
initiation and planning, functional failure analysis, and task selection according to IEC (IEC 
60300-3 2011). Initiation and planning is to define the scope/ boundary of the analysis. In this 
phase, system function will be evaluated and criticality of consequence from single failure 
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would be ranked. If the consequence seems to be critical, some functionality risk analysis like 
FMEA could be used to evaluate the severity consequence to the whole system out of single 
failure. With the result from the above analysis, actions could be made with consideration of 
both criticality and probability of occurrence. Different maintenance methods could be 
utilized for improving the reliability or correcting mistakes. 
 
Figure 10 RCM process (IEC 60300-3 2011) 
In Figure 10, the ‘RCM decision tree’ set the rule of selecting proper maintenance actions. By 
answering a serial of questions, the assessment of possible maintenance plans could be done, 
and proper maintenance practice could be chosen to implement. According to the definition 
from Alan (Alan 2010), the process is explained with more details in Figure!11.  !
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!
Figure'11 RCM decision tree (Alan 2010) 
Reliability centered maintenance is introduced to make full use of the present resources and 
at the same time increase the system’s reliability as well as cost efficiency. A comprehensive 
maintenance plan will be implemented during the production process, and it also means the 
competence of employees needs to be adapted accordingly to do a proper work. The pro and 
cons of RCM is listed in Table 7. 
Table 7 Pros and cons of Reliability centered maintenance (DOE 2010) 
Pros Cons 
• Increased component operational 
life/availability. 
• Allows for preemptive corrective 
actions. 
• Decrease in process downtime. 
• Decrease in costs for parts and labor. 
• Better product quality. 
• Improved worker/environment safety. 
• Improved worker morale. 
• Energy savings. 
• Estimated 8% to 12% cost savings 
over preventive maintenance 
program. 
• Increased investment in diagnostic 
equipment. 
• Increased investment in staff training. 
• Savings potential not readily seen by 
management. 
Will the failure have a 
direct and adverse 
effect on environment, 
health, security, safety? Will the failure have a 
direct and adverse 
effect on mission 
(quantity or quality)?
Is there an effective 
CM technology or 
approach?
Will the failure result 
in other economic loss 
(high cost damage to 
machines or system)?
Develop & schedule 
CM task to monitor 
condition
Is there an effective 
interval-based task?
Perform condition-
based task
Develop & schedule 
interval-based task
Redesign system, 
accept the failure risk, 
or install redundancy
Run to fail?
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
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2.3 Hazard identification, FTA 
2.3.1 Hazard identification 
2.3.1.1 Main principles 
Hazard is defined as the event that its occurrence could contribute or lead to unexpected 
event (incidents or accidents). The identification of hazards is the first step of further risk 
analysis, here in this thesis referring to FTA. Through systematic and unsystematic way of 
analyzing failure potentials, hopefully all critical hazardous conditions could be figured out 
and further risk analysis could be developed based on the results form hazard identification. 
There are many sources that contribute to hazard identification: 
• Historical records; 
• Regular and random safety reporting; 
• Data analysis results from condition monitoring tools; 
• Results from safety inspections, and operational safety audits; 
• Contributes from risk analysis team; 
• Information shared among all stakeholders, like operators, contractors, etc. 
The sources should be as wide as possible. Any hazard that is not identified at the analysis 
stage will not be discussed in further assessment (NORSOK Z013). Thus different methods 
of identifying hazards are suggested to collaborate for full cover of possible failure modes. 
For O&G industry in Norway, hazards identification is normally done with cooperation of 
HSE staff and third party risk analysis experts with rich experience and expertise. As 
consultancy service is quite expensive, only the most critical systems should be selected for 
analysis, and they should be done with consideration of various real operation conditions. 
The scope of the work is important for companies to define. And hazard identification should 
always be done in a comprehensive and accurate way. One implementation process of hazard 
identification is described by Comcare, shown in Figure 12 (Comcare 1994). 
 
Figure 12 Hazard identification process (Comcare 1994) 
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In the process, despite of existing hazard identification report, history records from company 
and industry performance could also be valuable attributes to systematic analysis. The 
analysis is recommended to be done on component’s level so that no major failure mode is 
going to be missed hopefully. There is a checklist recommended by British standards for 
analysts to go through (BS EN ISO17776:2002): 
• Hydrocarbons 
• Refined hydrocarbons 
• Other flammable materials 
• Explosives 
• Pressure hazards 
• Hazards associated with differences in height 
• Objects under induced stress 
• Dynamic situation hazards 
• Environmental hazards 
• Hot surfaces 
• Hot liquid 
• Cold surfaces 
• Cold fluids 
• Open flame 
• Electricity 
• Electromagnetic radiation 
• Ionizing radiation — Open source 
• Ionizing radiation — Closed source 
• Asphyxiates 
• Toxic gas 
• Toxic fluid 
• Toxic solid 
• Corrosive substances 
• Biological hazards 
• Ergonomic hazards 
• Psychological hazards 
• Security-related hazards 
• Use of natural resources 
• Medical 
• Noise 
• Entrapment 
Some requirement for hazard identification are explained by NORSOK (NORSOK Z-013 
2010): 
• Hazards should include all no matter they are under control of the company or not; 
• Utilization of BS EN ISO 17776 (listed above) checklist, safety survey and audits, 
internal/ external report, and FMEA; 
• The system basis for hazard identification analysis should be built up, and make sure 
that relevant personnel are aware of it; 
• To ensure all relevant hazard be identified, disciplines scope should be carefully 
defined; 
• The analysis should include: 
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a) Broad view of possible hazards and sources of accidents, and no relevant 
hazards should be overlooked; 
b) Critical and non-critical hazards should at least be roughtly classified; 
c) Identification of measure to control hazard; 
d) Classification of hazards relevant to emergency preparedness analysis if it is in 
it scope; 
• The documentation of the hazard identification shall as a minimum include: 
a) Personnel attending, 
b) Method/guide words applied, 
c) Statement of the criteria used in the screening of the hazards, 
d) Documentation of the evaluations made for the classification of the non-
critical hazards,  
e) Hazards that are excluded from further assessment, and the basis for this 
evaluation, 
f) Hazards identified with description of causes and consequences, 
g) Description of implemented safety barriers, 
h) Hazards that are to be subjected for further evaluation, 
i) Description of the system basis used in the hazard identification. 
To cover as wider as possible range of possible hazards, the analysis is normally done in 
three dimensions of time: past, present and future (Comcare 1994, Figure 13). Past refers to 
historical records from both internal and external sources. This gave an extra input of what 
has gone wrong in the past practice inside the whole industry. WOAD, HSE database, OGP 
risk assessment database, etc. could be used to screen relevant hazards. Present dimension is 
the hazards indicated from current condition and data. The work is normally done with 
various risk analysis tools like HAZOP and FMEA. If changes occur in either management or 
technical aspects, potential hazards should be identified, which is in the scope of future 
dimension. 
 
Figure 13 Past, present and future hazards (Comcare 1994) 
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2.3.1.2 Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis 
Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is an analysis that is designed to 
reveal the single failure effect and criticality to the system as a whole (Aven 2008). FMECA 
is a systematic functionality and reliability analysis tool, when implementing it the whole 
system is breakdown into components’ level. The procedure of conducting FMECA were 
firstly defined by US Armed Forces Military in 1994 (US department of defense 1949), and 
then spread to other industry in 1970s. In nowadays, FMECA is widely accepted as an 
effective tool to identify failure modes, and it nearly a must-do for manufacturers as well as 
operators during design phase. Feedback from this analysis is aslo an important input for 
designers to make necessary modifications in the early phase of a project, in a cost-effective 
way.  
According to IEC (IEC 60812 2006), the main objectives of FMEA include: 
• Referring to each component/sub system, identification and evaluation of possible 
causes as well as local and general effects due to unexpected events; 
• Classification of equipment with priority or criticality based on each failure mode; 
• Based on predefined relevant charactistics, rank failure modes; 
• Development/modification of design from the most critical failure modes; 
• Mitigation measures implemented to improve maintenance strategy. 
To ensure a systematic analysis of the whole system, a specific FMEA form need to be 
defined. There are many forms of displaying a FMECA analysis, like failure modes and 
effect analysis (FMEA), failure modes and maintenance analysis (FMMA), failure modes and 
symptoms analysis (FMSA), and etc. In the thesis, FMSA (ISO 13379 2002) is chosen as the 
form format due to the connection between its characteristic and CBM. Symptom is the core 
term in the analysis. It is defined, according to ISO (ISO 13379 2002), as a 
perception/measurement from visual observation or instrumentations. A FMSA table format 
is recommended by ISO 13379, shown in Table 8.  
Table 8 FMSA table sample (ISO 13379 2002) 
 
In this thesis, the utilization of data, and selection of data that is most critical to decision 
making in response with maintenance need are the main target. Due to the special needs of 
FMSA in this projects, some modifications to this FMSA format need to be done. And to 
make the conclusion clearer and easier to use, some formalized explanation/interpretation to 
certain columns in Table 8 will refer to items described in ISO 14224 (ISO 14224 2006). The 
modified table could be checked in Table 9. 
Table 9 Modified FMSA table format (Adapted from ISO 13379 2002) 
 
The columns in Table 9 are explained in the following: 
DET SEV DGN PGN DET SEV DGN PGN
Primary MPN
Correlation 
Technoques
Frequency 
of 
monitoring
Correlation MPN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks           
Item Part No
Fuction 
or 
process
Failure 
mode
Effect 
of 
failure
Cause 
of 
failure
Failure 
syptoms
Primary 
technique
Frequency 
of 
monitoring
System Sub-system Fuction or process Failure syptoms 
Failure 
mode 
(ISO 
14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of failure 
(ISO 14224)
Local failure 
effect
System 
failure effect DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=
DET*
SEV*
DGN*
PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
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System, subsystem: Specific component/system is identified here, and sometimes a system 
drawing or a functional diagram could be referred to as well; 
Function or process: Brief description of the functionality of the component/system, when in 
normal operation state.  
Failure symptoms: As described above, symptoms could be measurements from 
instrumentations, and perceptions during inspection/operation. It could be expressed in 
different forms:  
• Time, e.g. delayed, slow movement, etc. 
• Parameter measurements, e.g. pressure, temperature, etc. 
• Type of development and degree of change, e.g. stability, 10% deviation, etc. 
• Operation conditions, e.g. capacity utilization, noise, etc. 
Failure modes: It displays all the possible ways that one component might fail to function as 
designed. This is also in scope of single failure, which means combination of failures is not 
included in the discussion. The failure modes are defined in this project according to the 
definition in ISO 14224. (Appendix E) 
Failure mechanism: failure mechanism is a physical, chemical or other process, or a 
combination of any process that leads to the failure. Typically, according to ISO 14224, 
failure mechanism falls into following six failure types, and specific failure mechanism could 
be checked in appendix D. 
• Mechanical failure; 
• Material failure; 
• Instrumentation failure; 
• Electrical failure; 
• External influence; 
• Miscellaneous; 
Cause of failure: identification of initial event that might lead to the unexpected consequence. 
There are five main categories from ISO 14224, which are: design-related causes; 
fabrication/installation-related causes; failures related to operation/maintenance; failures 
related to management; miscellaneous. Detailed causes could be checked in appendix C. 
Local failure effect and system failure effect: single failure of component/system may induce 
a local impact on surrounding (logical and physical) component/system. Its dependency 
might fail as a result of its failure. Similarly, the system might be influenced in certain level 
of severity depending on the criticality and redundancy of the component/system. In this 
case, deficiencies of operation, safety threat to facility and human life, environmental 
pollution are the most critical consequence. And the failure modes that lead to any of these 
should be considered unacceptable. Detailed consequence could be checked in Table 10. 
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Table 10 Failure consequences classification (ISO 14224 2006) 
 
Monitoring priority number (MPN): the concept is defined by ISO (ISO 13379 2002) as a 
value that helps to prioritize the monitoring possibility and criticality to the system. It is a 
balanced value with consideration of four parameters: 
MPN=DET*SEV*DGN*PGN 
Where,  
DET: probability of detection, rating ranges from 1 (low) to 5 (high); 
SEV: severity of failure, rating ranges from 1 (negligible) to 5 (severe); 
DGN: diagnosis confidence, rating ranges from 1 (low) to 5 (high); 
PGN: prognosis confidence, rating ranges from 1 (low) to 5 (high); 
*Likert Scale: 
To determine the value of each parameter, Likert Scale (Likert 1932) model is introduced. A 
Likert scale is symmetric with, for example, the leftist item standing for entirely disagree, and 
the rightest item standing for entirely agree, and the middle point standing for neutral (Figure 
14 as an example). The value a respondent gives could be either subjective or objective. Here 
in this case, the likert scale starts from neutral point without negative values. The values for 
DET, SEV, DGN, and PGN are given by the author from his own experience, literature 
review and the company’s practice.  
 
Figure 14 Likert scale as an example  
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2.3.2 Fault tree analysis 
2.3.2.1 Description of FTA 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was firstly introduced in 1962 at Bell Laboratories by H.A. 
Watson to evaluate the one missile launch control system (Ericson 1999). FTA is a top-down 
deductive risk analysis tool, which is often used to find potential reasons that might lead to 
the ‘top event’. Here the top event normally refers to an unexpected event/incident/accident. 
A typical FTA diagram includes a top event, logic gates (Figure 15), propagation/sub event 
and basic events. The logic and propagation of incident/accident occurrence is thus shown 
quite clearly in the FTA diagram.  
 
Figure 15 Logic gates symbol (Aven 2008) 
Construction of a fault tree could follow below sequence (Pintelon, Frank 2006): 
• System definition. For hoisting system and its subsystems, components, functions and 
interrelations should be identified. 
• Top event selection, or failure mode definition. 
• Fault tree construction starting from the top event. 
• Probability assignment (will be discussed in future scope of work).  
From the FMEA analysis, the most critical systems could be ranked according to MPN value.  
FTA will be done on these subsystems. And a FTA on overall drawworks system will then be 
done afterwards. FTA could be done in a qualitative and quantitative way. Probability could 
be assigned to each events (basic events and sub-events) according to data from OREDA. 
The probability of occurrence of top event could then be calculated. In this project, the work 
will not be done due to limited data availability and time. 
2.3.2.2 Reliability analysis – Birnbaum’s importance measure 
According to Professor Aven (Aven 1992), quantitative analysis of FTA could be done in two 
aspects: 
1) Occurrence probability of top event  
2) Reliability importance (criticality) of the basic events of the tree. 
In this thesis, a reliability analysis method will be discussed as the quantitative analysis or 
criticality of failure. The importance of each component (basic events, sub-events) will be 
calculated for indication of condition monitoring priority. The calculation will be done partly 
instead of overall system due to limited database in chapter 4.2 in the thesis (Birnbaum’s 
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measure). The section is made to explain the method to implement reliability analysis as an 
quantitative extension development from FTA analysis.  
Reliability analysis provides a quantitative way to assess the criticality of single failure. 
Birnbaum’s importance measure, as a well-known sensitivity analysis method, is chosen to 
calculate each component in FTA’s reliability. It is quite appropriate in operation phase in oil 
production where each action is related to operation and maintenance parameters (Aven 
1992). Due to limited reliability data, the calculation will only done in one system just to 
show how to make this kind of analysis.  
For component i, the unreliability !! = !""#!""#!!""#  
In OREDA, all failure rates are assumed to be exponential distributed with parameter !. 
MTTF is thus calculated as: !""# = !!  
For failure on the component level, the failure rate of each part of the system is not given 
directly by OREDA. However, percentage of total failure rate for actual maintainable items 
failure modes/failure mechanism could be read directly in OREDA, and total failure rate 
could be read form OREDA database (for electric motors, the total failure rate is 58.72 per 
10^6 hours. MTTF on component/functionality level could thus be calculated. MTTR will be 
set equal to the average value from different failure modes. 
The logic gates in FTA could be transferred into reliability diagram, referring to Figure 16. 
The system reliability could then be easily calculated from reliability diagram with each 
component’s reliability available. 
 
Figure 16 Connection between reliability block diagram and FT (Aven 1982) 
The equation of Birnbaums’s importance measure is: !!! = ℎ 1! ,! − ℎ 0! ,! !!!!(!"#$!1992) 
where, p is the system reliability at the time the analysis is implemented, q is the system 
unreliability, ℎ(1! ,!) is the reliability of the system when component number i is in its best 
condition, and ℎ(0! ,!) is the reliability of the system when component number is fails to 
function. 
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2.4 Technical integrity management 
Technical integrity (TI) is defined as a facility’s fitness-for service and compliance with 
regulations for HSE protection and at the same time assuring the optimum return on 
investment (Ratnayake 2012). The purpose of TIM is to ‘reduce adverse affects caused by 
performance killers and cost drivers through a systematic analytical process’ (Kumar, 
Panesar, Markeset 2009). Integrity could only be achieved with a system thinking on design, 
technology and operation concerning. DNV has released two standards on establishing and 
maintaining integrity (DNV-OS-F101 2013, DNV-RP-F116 2009). Concept, design, 
construction and operation are preceded in a system-thinking manner. Contributors for 
integration management are shown in Figure 17, according to DNV. Generally, data 
management, integrated work process, decision support system, and competence 
management together provide the basis to achieve technical integrity. The flow to achieve 
better return on HSE, cost efficiency and productivity is shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 17 Integrity management (DNV-RP-F116 2009) 
In today’s context, O&G industry is widely experiencing a declining oil production, fiercer 
market competition, fluctuating prices (at present very low), aging facilities, and increased 
complexity of system. Like before, oil price stayed above US$100, which covered some of 
the problems mentioned above. Oil companies could invest more money on developing new 
oil fields to get more production, or increase maintenance frequency to maintain functionality. 
The management tended to pursue short-term profits. As the development of shale oil&gas, 
and over supply of O&G in the market, the present oil price could no longer support 
traditional way oil companies used to do. The reliability, safety and efficiency of operation 
and maintenance are facing great challenges. Long-term facility availability and efficiency, 
and reduced life-cycle-cost (LCC) are more attracting targets. Technical integrity 
management provides a solution to these emerging challenges. TI depends on available and 
qualitative data and information, managements’ ability and capacity to define operational and 
maintenance strategies, and personnel of obtaining and applying technical, economic, social 
and legal knowledge to ensure that a product, process, or system meets designed/expected 
safety, legal, and business requirements. “Ideally, the technical integrity of a facility is 
achieved when, under specified operating conditions, there is no feasible risk of failure 
endangering safety of personnel, environment or asset value.” (Officer W.S. 1991). Technical 
! -35- 
integrity management (TIM) is achieved through the implementation of the following 
managements. 
 
Figure 18 Integrity flow (Adapted from Liyanage 2003) 
2.4.1 Data management 
Data hides behind almost every operation and maintenance activities. The vibration spectrum 
is data. The wind speed and wave height is data. The frequency of preventive maintenance is 
data. Different kinds of data form a complex data structure for a facility. To collect correct 
data, and to assess data could add a great value on technical integrity management, which 
assist decision-making. Data is information, and should be flowing freely without limitation 
of business domains. Good management of data give the management acknowledges of what 
the situation they are standing in, and is the basis for making decisions and assuring technical 
integrity. However, data collection always needs trade-offs. The balance between cost and 
benefits of data is a continuously challenging task. Sometimes, accessibility of data is even 
impossible. For the common equipment, international standards organization give a list of 
what kinds of data is recommended to collect, and in what form should they be recorded and 
interpreted. As Soma (Soma et al. 2006) stated, a big challenge for manager is to ensure the 
accuracy of data, in what format should the data be recorded and transferred, and at what 
time the data is recorded and could be accessed. 
2.4.1.1 Data categories 
There are many kinds of data during the operation and maintenance activities. ISO identifies 
three kinds of data that needs to be collected. 
a) Equipment data 
To describe the equipment’s function and condition, classification data, equipment attributes, 
and operation data could be used. Some data is required to be collected for common 
equipment, and for certain category of equipment specific data needs to be collected. As 
illustrated by ISO (ISO 14224 2006), data to all common equipment is listed in Table 11.  
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Table 11  Equipment data common to all equipment classes (ISO14224 2006) 
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b) Failure data 
Failures that occur during operation, maintenance or other activities should be recorded in a 
detailed and formalized way. The description of which equipment, in what situation, the 
occurrence date, failure modes, failure impact, failure causes, failure detection method should 
be done when a failure happens. Data that needs to be recorded in common equipment is 
recommended by ISO in Table 12. 
Table 12 Failure data (ISO 14224 2006) 
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c) Maintenance data 
Maintenance occurs when there is a need to correct failures, or to implement planned 
(normally periodically, as called preventive maintenance) maintenance activities to prevent 
failure’s happening. Recording of maintenance activities with enough details is necessary for 
maintenance engineers as well as reliability engineers to implement further analysis, for 
example, life time analysis could be executed with failures and preventive maintenance data 
recordings by reliability engineers. According to ISO, corrective maintenance data is required 
to record, preventive maintenance is recommended to record, and planned preventive 
maintenance program is optional to record (ISO14224 2006). It is also important to tell, if 
there is any, when too much PM activities are executed on certain equipment. It will just as 
harmful as not enough PM (LNS Research 2015).  
Data categories in maintenance part include: identification, maintenance data, maintenance 
resources, and maintenance time. Details could be checked in Table 13. 
Table 13 Maintenance data (ISO 14224 2006) 
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2.4.1.2 Data format 
Data records should be saved in the database by certain number of attributes as ISO 
suggested. Codes are often used to simplify the data information. And data becomes easy to 
categorized and analyzed. The benefits include (ISO 14224 2006): 
• Facilitation of queries and analysis of data, 
• Ease of data input, 
• Consistency check undertaken at input, by having predefined code lists, 
• Minimization of database size and response time of queries. 
Besides of the benefits from predefined codes, detailed information might be lost due to the 
simplicity and limitation of codes. And codes could also be difficult to be recognized/read 
directly by personnel. Free text is still needed to cope with predefined codes, as a simple 
explanation or addition to the codes.  
2.4.1.3 Data structure 
Data is collected and recorded into certain format. The database for storage of data is 
supposed to be designed with convenience of reading, upgrading, queries, and analysis (ISO 
14224 2006). Data is stored inside frame of data structure, which is a structure that combines 
all the data categories (equipment data, failure data, maintenance data) together with logical 
links. It provides the basis of building the database. The logical relations help stakeholders 
understand each data elements’ origins, requirements and impact.  
Data structure includes two aspects, physical data and logical data structure. Physical data 
structure refers to the storage and transmission of data, like hard disk, tapes, cable lines, etc. 
One major concern in TI context is the compatibility of data exchange between various 
stakeholders. For operators in NCS, SAP is normally in process management, while Safran, 
for example, is often used by sub-contractors. The data exchange between the two is time 
consuming. For engineers, analysts, and stakeholders, they are more concerned about the 
logical data structure.  
For hoisting system, for instance, data collected during O&M activities could be failures, 
corrective/preventive maintenance related. For a failure incident, the corresponding 
corrective maintenance activity could be related to it. Similarly, the failure might be a result 
of one or many failures from its lower level of components/systems. The condition of these 
items should be referred to in the logic structure. PM activities are similar. Improved 
efficiency could be calculated by reliability engineers from the data like increased mean time 
between failures.  
Data could be organized in hierarchical structure, network structure, and relational structure 
(Cl500.net 2015). The above paragraph is an example of hierarchical structure (also seen in 
Figure 19). The difference of network data structure from hierarchical data structure is that 
network structure allows a node to have more than one parent. Relational data network 
organizes data in a two dimensional way. It describe data with two dimensions, and this also 
means that to build up the structure needs more elaborate work, and to look for it needs a bit 
more time than the other two methods. However, relational data network is becoming a very 
popular data structure. 
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Figure 19 Hierarchical data structure as an example (ISO 14224 2006) 
 
2.4.1.4 Enterprise integration and interoperability 
Enterprise integration focuses on topics as system interconnection, data interchange, data 
exchange and distributed computing environment. It aims to provide the right information at 
the right time and place, and guarantees the efficiency of communication and cooperation 
between people, machine and computer systems (MIMOSA, Vernadat 1996). Other than 
information communication and sharing issue, enterprise integration is a strategic challenge, 
which is designed to respond to rapid changing market and technological upgrade. The 
enterprise integration serves the needs mentioned above through methods shown below (Nell, 
Kosanke 1997): 
• Identify the right information. It is required that the exact information needed and 
created during enterprise operation is acknowledged precisely. And the knowledge of 
information needs to be structured so that the product and administration information, 
and resources involved in operation process is described clearly. The operation 
process could thus be optimized accordingly; 
• Update information in real-time. Not only operational data needs to be updated during 
operation process, but also information from changes on environment, customer 
demands, technology revolution, new legislation, and mass attitude. The up-date of all 
these information helps to reflect the actual operational condition of the enterprise. 
• Provide right information at the right place. This basically requires an information 
sharing and communication system, which is capable of handling information 
transaction across heterogeneous environment including separate hardware, different 
operating systems, different software interfaces, different departments, or even 
different organizations. The harmonizing characteristics enable the transferring of 
information across and beyond organization boundaries. 
• Coordinate business processes. The modeling of enterprise operation needs to be done 
in a very precise way, with precise and logical business process defined, and with 
right information and resources in position whenever is needed. To achieve this, the 
real-time decision support and evaluation of decision alternatives on operation are the 
same essential as information sharing and communication system. 
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• Organize and adapt the enterprise with changing environment. Besides the 
information update possibility, the availability and accessibility of knowledge on 
enterprise operation status, market fluctuation, new technology and other environment 
changes. The data structure should be designed with easy identification and 
accessibility for relevant information. 
Interoperability is a property of a system to work with other systems, present or future, with 
no restricted access or implementation, and the systems’ interfaces should be entirely 
understandable (AFUL). Information during engineering, construction, commissioning and 
operation of production facilities is generated, collected, used and modified by many 
different organizations throughout a facility's lifetime. ISO set up the standard on integration 
of these lifetime data based on POSC study in 1997 (POSC Caesar Association), and defines 
the concept as “the ability of different types of computers, networks, operating systems, and 
applications to work together effectively, without prior communication, in order to exchange 
information in a useful and meaningful manner” (ISO 15926-2003). Enterprise 
interoperability is something that goes beyond system’s compatibility, as it allows the 
exchange of services other than pure technique that compatibility defines. Interoperability 
goes below integration. Integrated system must be interoperable, while interoperable system 
does not need to be integrated. For interoperability, systems could function independently, 
while integrated system would fail if service flow is interrupted somewhere (Panetto, Molina 
2007). 
2.4.2 Integrated work process  
Integrated operation is firstly introduced by OLF in 2005. It is defined by OLF as “real time 
data onshore from offshore fields and new integrated work processes” (OLF 2005). This is 
discussed in scope of Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). Integrated work process (IWP) 
covers all functional disciplines in O&G industry, including logistics, maintenance, well 
intervention, production, drilling, and modification (Yu, Liyanage, 2012). 
 
Figure 20 Integrated operation (OLF 2005) 
Operation has experienced from previous limited integration of work process to fully 
integrated work process. In generation 1 (hereafter G1) shown in Figure 20, advanced 
onshore support centers are established to cope with offshore platform. This allows online 
and immediate communication on technical and management support. This redefines the 
work process for the first time. Offshore and onshore disciplines no longer work in an 
isolated situation. The establishment of connection between internal work processes allows 
the planning of work to be more flexible, and reasonable. In generation 2 (here after G2), 
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integration extends from internal work process into wider internal and external work process. 
An integration of different geographical locations, production holders and vendors is 
executed in G2 (Yu, Liyanage 2012). This makes it possible to implement continuous 
monitoring of condition of facilities, and to provide onshore-based operational support with 
full assistance from engineers as well as vendors. Integrated planning helps to reorganize 
once decentralized work plans (Yu, Liyange 2012), shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21 IP process frame (Yu, Liyanage 2012) 
The design of work process in an oil company includes many aspects like production, 
operation, maintenance, documentation, quality management, and financial expectation. In 
the context of IWP, some critical parts should be taken more care of: 
2.4.2.1 Communication of information and business logic 
The basis for IWP is that information of operation and maintenance should be available and 
easy for all parties involved in the process to enhance decisions. Operating conditions should 
be accessible to all critical stakeholders during operation, and at the same time, 
feedbacks/requirements from stakeholders should be visible to operators in an efficient way. 
There are several kinds of communication ways of information. As Yu and Liyanage stated 
(Yu, Liyanage 2007), 4 major types are utilized widely as of today: 
• Point-to-point: integration achieved by rewriting the transacting handling codes to 
make the communication of information between two applications easier. 
• Database-to-database: extension of point-to-point configuration. It is an integration 
achieved by sharing information among databases that maintains the same kinds of 
data on all sources. 
• Enterprise integration application: is the use of software/computer systems' 
architectural principles to integrate a set of enterprise computer applications. It allows 
the sharing of data/information as well as business logics inside the enterprise with no 
concern of physical distance or discipline boundaries. 
• Application server integration: extension of enterprise integration application, but this 
allows easy and efficient communication of information and business logic.  
2.4.2.2 Planning of work in context of IWP 
There are several concerning during the designing of integrated work process. Work priorities 
need to be adequately defined, resources need to be arranged, logistic needs to be planned, 
and so on. The following aspects are found to be the most critical concerning in IWP 
planning of offshore operation and maintenance activities.   
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a) Accommodation plan.  
Logistics between onshore and offshore is normally done by ships. The cost of renting ships 
is very high, and the accessibility of ships to platform needs to be qualified due to waves and 
weather condition. The arrange of logistic plan should be done with consideration of ship 
deck air, capacity of holding, accessibility of platform, accommodation space on platform, 
and etc. For operators in NCS, the work is normally done by SAP. SAP could help the 
planner to pack all requests in a time range so that the ship’s space is made full use of. The 
work is done by SAP automatically, but it may induce problems too. 
On the one hand, the loading capacity of the supply ship is limited. To make full use of its 
deck space might induce overweight of its loading capacity. The lifting designing engineer 
who works simultaneously in the project could warn logistic engineer from calculation results. 
The communication between two parties should be efficient and reliable. On the other hand, 
the limited deck space and accommodation rooms on platform are limited. Sometimes, some 
staff or equipment has to be sent back to onshore due to bad planning.  In a word, logistics 
could be very costly (time and money) processes in offshore platforms.  
b) Priority of work, and minimization of downtime 
In maintenance context, different kinds and severity levels of maintenance notifications need 
to be classified and prioritized. Some maintenance could be done without breaking down the 
production, while some needs, some maintenance activities could be done 
together/simultaneously in purpose of shortening downtime, and some work need to be done 
before another. Through G1 (Yu, Liyanage 2012), onshore and offshore could be connected. 
Engineers on offshore platform could notify the maintenance needs to onshore engineers in 
an efficient way. Maintenance could be assessed from both offshore operators and onshore 
expertise. Corrective maintenance could be done combined with preventive maintenance with 
a tolerance of time, for example, so that the production won’t be interrupted too often due to 
maintenance activates. This could be very challenging in traditional organizations, as all 
disciplines might come up with some maintenance needs. The integrated work process 
principle sheds a light on the communication and negotiation dilemma. Notice should be put 
on the perception difference on priority between offshore engineers and onshore engineers 
(Yu, Liyanage2007). 
c) Sufficient training 
With the utilization of integrated work process, the planning and implementation of work has 
changed a lot. Cooperation with different disciplines also shifts from isolated state to 
simultaneous state. Personnel need to adapt themselves to the changes. Meanwhile, training 
on business strategy, new communication tools, new interfaces of integrated work process, 
and new technologies are urgent and critical to failure rates in the early time of utilization of 
work process integrity.  
d) Emergency preparedness 
The reporting and decision making system to emergencies like weather conditions, 
incidents/accidents, technology difficulties or expertise absence at site need to be discussed 
thoroughly in the context of IWP. Notification of emergency should be done in a time critical 
way, and should be reported with a suggested plan from the platform engineers to onshore 
support centers. Depending on the criticality of incidents, necessity of further assessments 
needs to be discussed with several disciplines involved. Third parties would also give their 
advices and requirements on safety operation and risk mitigation. 
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2.4.3 Decision support system 
2.4.3.1 Structure of a decision condition 
If the scope is limited into maintenance strategy decision in context of TIM, an analytical 
hierarchy process could be used to set a decision-making structure (Figure 22, Ratnayake & 
Markeset 2010). In today’s business context, sustainability has been a key factor for 
companies to achieve continuous success. Ratnayake and Liyanage explained about the 
significance of incorporating sustainability concepts to plant level operations while striking a 
balance between financial and HSE factors (Ratnayake & Liyanage 2007). Once there is a 
maintenance need, concerning on HSE and financial impact are chosen to be priorities in a 
hierarchical decision making practice.  
 
Figure 22 Model for measuring HSE performance whilst giving equal priority for financial consciousness in TI-
related decision-making system (Ratnayake & Markeset 2010) 
The structure is constituted of five levels. The first level is the maintenance decision 
objective in context of TIM. The second level is HSE and finance related decision criteria. 
Some sub-criteria under HSE and finance criteria are the third and fourth level. The fifth 
level is the possible alternatives to choose from, like corrective maintenance, or preventive 
maintenance strategy. The model could hopefully lead to a balanced decision with the most 
critical considerations in place. It could be of great help on reducing the risk of safety 
operation and environmental impact, and financial target management. And a reliable 
business image could also be built.  
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2.4.3.2 Decision support system (DSS) 
Decisions are made in all disciplines and from both offshore and onshore. For discipline 
experts, decisions could be made in a reliable and efficient way with necessary data in hand. 
However, for many other people, assistance from either experts or machine interface is still 
needed. That is to say, besides the traditional decision support system, a proactive DDS is 
also needed in today’s decision making practice on maintenance notifications.  
There are several decision support system, like Bayesian Belief Network (BBN), and some 
other quantitative or qualitative methods. FTA could also be used as a decision support tool, 
as it displays the propagation of single failure and could also be combined with importance 
measurement to give quantitative indications. For different levels of FTA, decisions are faced 
by different levels of management. The importance measure of the component in FTA could 
also be used by decision makers.  
Meantime, some proactive decision support systems are developing. Expert system (ES) was 
actually widely utilized from 1980s (Leondes 2002). With the increasing demand to have 
intelligent DSS, ES is required by decision makers to incorporate intelligent computing 
system that could gather and process various data. The intelligent DSS is context aware 
(Ohbyung et al. 2005), which was supposed that could only be finished by human brain. A 
ubiquitous decision support system (UbiDSS) is introduced by Ohbyung et al. “When 
considering a ubiDSS, however, one of the most obvious differences is that the ubiDSS 
acquires contextual data, as well as data from a conventional database.” (Ohbyung et al. 
2005), which includes knowledge-based, model management, database management, and 
dialogue subsystems. The contextual data could be collected from variety of trackers, like 
various sensors. Contextual data could be too primitive for users to read, and control 
inference module is needed to convert the data into an inferred context (data-to-decision 
interface). Then ‘action request module’ will transmit the contextual data to the knowledge-
based system, data management system and model management system in a standard 
readable format. The UbiDSS frame is shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23 Frame of Ubiquitous Decision Support System (Ohbyung et al. 2005) 
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2.4.4 Competence management 
Competence, according to HSE, means “the ability to undertake responsibilities and perform 
activities to a relevant standard, as necessary to ensure process safety and prevent major 
accidents” (HSE COMAH). Competence is a combination of knowledge, skills, experience 
and personal attitude/intention. And it could be classified into: transferrable, universal and 
unique competence (Dwarakanath 2009), including skills and knowledge, acknowledge of 
company culture/value, and abilities or know-how in specific area. 
2.4.4.1 Competence management system 
Competence management refers to the arrangements of activities within the company to 
implement and assure competent performance in a logical and integrated way. It means the 
employee should have clear image of the work expectations, and have the competence to 
execute tasks in an expected way with predictable achievements. Proper and continuous 
training is normally needed to keep competence over time, especially in context of TIM, 
where many new techniques and communication methods are incorporated into operation 
process. Like any management system, competence management system (CMS) consists 
planning, designing, implementing, monitoring and reviewing. HSE suggests five steps to 
build up a CMS, shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24 Competence Management System (HSE COMAH) 
It is very important to define the requirements for CMS in phase 1, as it is the basis of the 
CMS and determines the risk potential during operation. Individuals that are currently 
competent to tasks may become incompetent over time. CMS is a continuous process that 
monitoring competence continuously, and assess and trained staff in accordance with various 
tasks.  
2.4.4.2 Skill sets and knowledge management 
Skill sets are a group of competences that are combined together to meet certain position 
needs. Unlike qualifications, which are formal certifications issued by proved body, skill sets 
combine particular category of skills and knowledge together. For different disciplines, skill 
sets could be technological knowledge, selling skills, strategic skills, or human relations. In 
the past practice, for instance, skill sets for a supply manager means the buying skills. 
However, the changes in business environment and increased demand from upper 
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management extend the position’s skill set into wider range, like supplier market research, 
cost analysis, and outsourcing decisions (Giunipero, Handfield, Eltantawy, 2006).  
The skill sets in today’s business context will require competence of strategic skills for 
engineers, and necessary technological competence for management. Not only their own 
business skills are needed, but also the competence to adapt to ever-changing business 
environment is included. Changes include the market condition, globalized operation, 
technological evolution, information exchange and communication system improvement, and 
increased demand from management. All the changes contribute the incorporating of full 
range of competence into skill sets. The core process for each discipline is expanded as a 
result. Strategic skills should be specially emphasized in this context. Many researchers 
support the contribution of strategic skills on organization’s value growth (Anderson & Katz, 
1998; Giunipero & Pearcy, 2000). 
To make full use of all skills and knowledge inside organization, knowledge management 
(KM) is introduced. As defined by Duhon, "Knowledge management is a discipline that 
promotes an integrated approach to identifying, capturing, evaluating, retrieving, and sharing 
all of an enterprise's information assets. These assets may include databases, documents, 
policies, procedures, and previously un-captured expertise and experience in individual 
workers." (Duhon 1998) Knowledge management is consisted of four parts, according to 
Koenig (Koenig 2012), which are: 
1) Making organization’s data and information available. Data and information could be 
made available through the use of enterprise portals and content management system, 
which is normally a computer application that provides a central interface to publish, 
edit, modify, organize and deleting contents; 
2) Lessons learned databases. This was called best practice database. As the word ‘best’ 
could vary a lot under different condition and environment, the term was changed to 
‘lessons learnt’. It captures and makes accessible knowledge and experience that are 
obtained by individuals during business operation process; 
3) Expertise location. This is about the accessibility of experts who has the specific 
expertise or experience that is needed. The basic idea of this location system is to 
identify, locate and contact the person who has the knowledge on a particular area; 
4) Communities of practice. The communities are groups of individuals who come 
together in person or virtually to share and discuss strength, weakness, opportunities, 
threats that organizations have, and discus lessons learnt as well as the best practical 
solutions.  
The development of knowledge management is shown in Figure 25 (Koenig 2012) : 
 
Figure 25 Development of KM (Adapted from Koenig 2012) 
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2.4.4.3 Interdisciplinary competence 
Disciplines in traditional organizations normally have clear boundaries and function 
independently. As many observers argued (Klein & Newell 1997; Repko 2012;National 
Research Council 2004), disciplines are recognized as the fundamental for creation of 
knowledge. It is also reckoned as the way to show each discipline’s contribution in a clear 
way. However, understanding of the inner socially constructed nature of disciplines, as stated 
by Lattuca (Lattuca 2001), will contribute to one’s willingness to cross discipline boundaries 
and acceptance of others into one’s own discipline. Interdisciplinary competence involves the 
combination of two or more disciplines of competence in the structure of competence 
management system. It achieves an integration of different disciplinary knowledge, allows 
the crossing of traditional discipline boundaries, and encourages system thinking.  
In context of interdisciplinary competence, the focus is shifted from general knowledge of 
one’s own discipline to knowledge of how each discipline informs its insights into the 
problemRepko 2012). The knowledge of other discipline’s competence and contribution 
could bring in a whole image of any problem. This also helps to identify the strength and 
weakness of separate disciplines. It allows and encourages the learning of knowledge across 
discipline boundaries. During the procedure, skills could be enhanced, data flow is activated, 
information and knowledge is exchanged, and social networks and reputation could be built 
as well. Singular discipline knowledge on either management or specific engineering 
discipline is no longer the qualified answer of reliable decision-making with consideration of 
complex data sets and ever changing business & technological environment. This is more 
important in the context of boundary-less decision-making structure, where everyone in the 
organization is entitled with right to make various decisions. The interdisciplinary 
competence could greatly improve the decision-makers’ as well as team’s ability of dealing 
with complex problems.  
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Part 3 Case study 
According to research from Faller, the most critical equipment for offshore drilling facility 
are top drive, drawworks, and mud pumps (Faller, 2008). Drawworks is chosen by the author 
as the study object in this thesis. The case study part will cover three chapters: chapter 3, 4 
and 5. Chapter 3 is aimed to identify the most critical failure modes of drawworks system. 
The identification will be done through three ways: company practice, literature review, and 
FMSA analysis. In chapter 4, FTA will be built by the author based on all critical failure 
modes identified from chapter 3 (as basic events of FTA). FTA is supposed to be the basis for 
further discussion on data management and decision making process. It provides a structure 
to indicate criticality and incorporate data into decision-making system. In chapter 5, 
recommended data architecture and maintenance decision making practice will be elaborated 
by the author. 
 
3 Failure modes identification of drawworks (Case study) 
This chapter is aimed to identify the most critical failure modes of drawworks system. The 
identification will be done through three ways: company practice, failure modes screening 
from literature review and technical drawwing, and FMSA analysis, where the seond method 
develops from structure breakdown, and FMSA is a functionaility breakdown analysis. 
3.1 Study boundary 
The research object is a drawwork that was installed back in 1995. It is AC motor driven 
drawworks with expected 2000 horse power manufactured by Dreco Energy Services Ltd. 
The drawworks is approved by DNV-GL. For this part, the main failure modes are identified 
by using three methods, which are company practice, screening from literature as well as 
technical drawing, and systematic FMSA analysis. In FMSA, only single failure is considered 
instead of combined failure modes.  
 
Figure 26 Failure modes identification 
Critical!failure!modes!
Company!practice!of!drawwork!operation!
Failure!modes!screening!from!literature!FMSA!anslysis!
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3.2 Company practice of drawwork operation 
Drawworks is supposed to be quite reliable in most of the time from the view of the company 
in this case. Time based preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance are executed on 
the drawworks. The history maintenance data on drawworks in last ten years are shown 
below in Table 14: 
Table 14 Maintenance actions from 2004-2014 in the company 
 
 
 
Figure 27 Pie chart of comparison between different maintenance strategies from 2004-2014 
From the table above, the ratio of corrective maintenance is much lower than preventive 
maintenance, but unwanted failure still happens now and then. As Narayan stated in his book 
(Naranyan 2012), more work could be planned with a high ratio of preventive maintenance, 
and performance could be improved as a result. Due to different mechanisms and reliability 
of systems, the proportion of breakdown varies. There is no ideal ratio of preventive 
maintenance actions for all. For certain system, failure modes and effect analysis should be 
done systematically to get an expected ratio for different maintenance strategy. As is shown 
in Figure 27, the main concern is to minimize the risk of incidents that have serious impact 
on safety, environmental, adverse publicity or production, which can reduce the viability and 
profitability of an organization, both in the short and long term, and to do so at the lowest 
total cost. 
 
Figure 28 Risk limitation model (Naranyan 2012) 
Maintenance(action 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Preventive(maintenanance 14 18 14 18 16 14
percentage 78% 95% 100% 90% 100% 82%
corrective(maintenance 4 1 0 2 0 3
percentage 22% 5% 0% 10% 0% 18%
Maintenance(action 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Preventive(maintenanance 16 13 16 16 19
percentage 89% 81% 94% 84% 100%
corrective(maintenance 2 3 1 3 0
percentage 11% 19% 6% 16% 0%
90%$
10%$
Preven+ve$maintenanance$ correc+ve$maintenance$
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If the maintenance is classified according to the causes, preventive maintenance activities 
refer to planned inspection and annual DNV-GL-GL inspection, and corrective maintenance 
includes check/ adjustment of system, unwanted failure, change of component and 
modification according to DNV-GL-GL suggestions. In last ten years, 19 corrective 
maintenance activities on drawworks were done, which is quite acceptable according to the 
drilling manager in the company. As a general feeling, this Dreco drawworks is very reliable. 
 
Figure 29 Pie chart of reasons of maintenance from 2004-2014 in the company 
However, the company experienced one major failure that led to about 17 days downtime of 
the total production in 2011. The error occurred during uninstallation of drawworks as part of 
the five-year-period recertification of DNV-GL in 2011. Bearings were heated to be removed 
from drum shaft. The temperature was supposed to be at about 100-150 centigrade degree, 
but the heat is higher in operation and transferred to the drum shaft unexpected. The overheat 
caused a change in property of material, which lead to a breakage on the shaft.  
Though very rarely (relatively) major accident happens, the serious accident in 2011 and the 
long downtime it brought in still indicate the importance of maintaining drawworks. As 
industry introducing new techniques on monitoring the condition of drawworks, more 
detailed risk analysis on the equipment will help understanding the system better. 
3.3 Failure modes screening from extended literature and technical drawings 
In the section, the failure modes will be identified from both literature review and real case 
information. The failure modes from literature review are already discussed in chapter 2.1.2. 
In this case, the Dreco drawworks is equipped with no cathead. Drawwork could be described 
with structure breakdown method as including hoisting drum shaft assembly, braking system, 
transmission system, control system, lubrication system, and supporting system.  
1) Hoisting drum shaft assembly: 
The drawing of the drum assembly could be checked in Appendix A. A metallic clanking 
noise may indicate a possible misalignment/ failure on drum barrel or shaft. The drum failure 
may display as breakage of drum barrel, buckling of drum barrel, wearing of drum shaft, and 
insufficient clutch of drum. Drum failure will definitely breakdown of the whole drilling 
system and bring in unexpected downtime. 
For breakage of drum barrel/ flange, this might be a result of propagation of cracks on drum 
barrel, lack of routine maintenance, or over-wearing from frequent heavy hoisting. NDT is 
supposed to be executed on drum barrel by manufacturer and yearly by the third class 
83%$
6%$
6%$
1%$ 2%$ 2%$
planned$inspec1on$
planned$annual$DNV$inspec1on$
check/adjustment$of$system$
Unwanted$failure$
change$of$component$
Modiﬁca1on$according$to$DNV$sugges1on$
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qualification party (DNV-GL in this case) yearly (Dreco drawworks manual 1994), yet some 
cracks might still be created during operation. However, it normally needs time to propagate 
and there are always signals that show the imperfection of its condition, so visual inspection 
might be helpful in this case as a supplement. Besides, the length of the drum should be taken 
into serious consideration to make sure no higher than four layers of drill lines are wrapped 
on it, which might exert excessive spreading forces on the drum flanges (Dreco drawworks 
manual 1994). 
Thickness of drum rim is determined after determining the inward radial force exerted by the 
wire line for each layer. Once the radial force is determined, horizontal components are found 
by vector analysis. The allowable bending stress is supposed to be 60% of the material yield 
strength (Dreco drawworks manual 1994). Over loading might induce buckling of drum 
barrel.  
Wearing of drum shaft and bearing normally is quite noticeable due to the noise it brings. The 
problem in offshore field is that the high environmental noise may cover a bit of the clanking 
noise. Over-worn shaft must be replace to keep hoisting efficiency as soon as the problem is 
uncovered. Proximity probes and vibration transducers could thus be installed on the shaft to 
detect the rotating condition of the shaft, and they are quite reliable in most cases. 
Lack of enough clutch of drum may cause the delayed response of hoisting, and strike of drill 
line and vibration followed-by. The wear of clutch might be a reason of this, and also the 
coupling tightness needs also to be considered.  
Table 15 Critical failures and maintenance practice on drum shaft assembly 
Critical failures Recommended maintenance programs 
Breakage of drum barrel/flange Corrective maintenance 
Buckling of barrel Predictive maintenance (force transducer) 
Wearing of shaft/bearing Predictive maintenance (visual, oil analysis) 
Insufficient clutch  Predictive maintenance (visual) 
 
2) Braking system: 
During the hoisting or loading of drill pipes/ casings, electric motor will work as the driving 
force. The holding/ parking function is activated through employing braking system. Failure 
of braking will cause very severe consequence on the equipment as well as human lives. This 
may be induced by disengagement of braking system, an excessive air gap between the 
drawworks brake pads and the brake rotors, disc braking system failure, or control errors. In 
this case, the disc braking system is designed as fail-safe device. A redundant emergency 
braking system is engaged automatically if power or pressure failure ever happens. The loss 
of the two is not acceptable from the design principle.  
Braking system failure might be caused by pneumatic system failure, clearance of calipers, 
slow response of caliper, overheat that leads to deformation of disc, overweight of load, or 
control error. The failures could all decrease the friction of the braking discs and accordingly 
reduce the capacity of parking the loading. A leakage of air supply system might reduce the 
efficiency of the air-controlled braking system. Clearance of calipers needs to be checked 
daily according to the operation manual in the company to make sure the capacity of braking. 
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The requirements for the clearance have to be strictly followed by operators. The brakes are 
designed to be air cooled. Normally, this allows a quite high rate of energy absorption. 
However, in situations where braking discs are operated in high temperatures, high pressures, 
or high-level ratios, localized plastic deformation might occur in the discs. This will end up 
with uneven energy distribution on the disc and gradually lead to disc failure. Besides, 
wirelines need to be tested and cut periodically to make sure the strength and reliability 
during operation. 
Human error is also an important threat of failure that should be taken into consideration. As 
discussed in Mr. Liyanage’s article, critical systems is experiencing a process where on the 
one hand go through a physical miniaturization and on the other advanced functions 
(Liyanage 2014). At present, large and complex equipment is likely to facilitate with 
redundancies and ‘fail safe’ principle (DNV-GL 2012), which resulted in improved reliability 
of equipment. However, as professor Terje Aven discussed, risk could not be eliminated but 
should be managed (Aven 2010). Technology and maintenance management principles could 
not cover all human checks to eliminate risks, and normally data collected from sensors tend 
to be overwhelming and could be difficult to tell the trend. And data collection is a procedure 
of sampling which make the data we have obtained to be somehow subjective and failure 
signals might be hidden as a result. It is not totally because of carelessness or ignorance that 
make worker miss the signal to fail, but could also be a matter of opportunity (Resaon 1995). 
By saying so, there are two aspects to illustrate: 
• Errors that are made by operators on-site and have immediate effect. This kind of 
incident happens at the point of contact between a front-line human and some large 
complex system. 
In a accident recorded by United States department of labor, braking system failure 
caused the fall of travelling block, which killed one driller (OSHA 2006). The 
redundant emergency braking system is supposed to be triggered automatically once 
pressure or power is lost. When the travelling block is falling without control, the 
main brake system failed totally as a result of deformation from accumulated braking 
heat. An unexpected disengagement of electric brake finally caused the tragedy. The 
investigation of the accident revealed that the electric brake coupling handle latch 
was not bolted which disengage the auxiliary brake from the drawworks. And poor 
manual inspection program did not work as a effective approach to help avoid this 
accident. 
• Errors that could hide for long time and will only happen when they combine with 
other specific incidents’ occurrences. It may originate from dependencies of 
redundant systems or common failure of equipment from same supplier. It could be 
generally said to be ‘accidents waiting to happen’  (Reason 1990). For instance, 
maintenance engineer failed to tell a component’s trend to fail from a data scatter 
plot. As a result, the component has to be replaced and downtime of the whole 
system is increased long time after detection. Besides, human might be aware of risks 
they are facing and may reckon that everything is under control. While so many 
incidents that happened in history reveal sometimes they tend to be over optimistic. 
But human could also have sense to potential disasters. This is the reason that in 
present condition monitoring system, visual inspection is still an important part of 
monitoring plan.  
Another accident recorded by U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management 
Service (MMS) shows the severe consequence from contamination and air gap 
between brake pads and discs (David et al. 2000). The travelling block falls down 
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after failure of braking system. The top drive, 19 joints of riser, and BOP fell on the 
seabed as a result. The cause is a mix of mechanical failure and human error. During 
a trimming operation of supply vessel, the driller decided to pick up the load with 
braking system instead of motor hoisting system, which was not the only choice but 
was acceptable. According to the investigation of the accident afterwards, the failure 
of braking system was caused by contamination between brake pads and discs from 
improper lubricant, and bigger air gap between brake pads and discs. The expected 
quality was clearly explained and required in the user operation manual. The 
ignorance of its severity and bad management just contributed to the failure. The 
accident also implied the importance of professional training. When the driller 
realized both braking systems failed and tried to pick up the load by motor hoisting 
system, there was no response. The thing was the driller or other operator did not 
acknowledge that the brake had to be disengaged in order to activate motor system. 
This definitely showed the great impact for the lack of acknowledgement of 
operation sequence.  The redundancy of system and all the mitigation methods are 
helpless if human made such errors. 
Table 16 Critical failures and maintenance practice on braking system 
Critical failures Recommended maintenance program 
Breakage of caliper/brake discs Preventive maintenance 
Breakage of wire line  Preventive maintenance 
Air gap between brake disc and band Predictive maintenance (visual) 
Human error Corrective maintenance 
 
3) Electric motor and power transmission system 
The drawworks is equipped with two customer furnished A.C. motors with forced air-cooling 
system. The hoisting/ lowering power is generated by the two motors, and they are designed 
to be redundant to each other. The loss of both electric motors is not acceptable to the point 
of risk analysis. The causes for the loss might be among: start failure, control failure, short 
circuiting, and earth isolation fault. For transmission system in this case, link-belt chain is 
used. There are three shafts, which are input shaft, jackshaft and drum shaft. The clutches are 
used to engage a drive or transmission chain thereby transmitting power to the drum and drill 
line. The selection of chain size and the width of chain, and drum clutch slip torque capacity 
are the main concerning during designing phase. Proper maintenance is of great need for 
running this chain transmission system properly. Failure of the transmission system will 
definitely lead to failure of the drawworks and hoisting system. This is unacceptable on risk 
analysis perspective. The possible failure causes are therefore listed: 
• Short/open circuiting 
• Motor start failure 
• The chain drive is incorrectly lubricated; 
• Worn/ damaged chains or sprockets; 
• The sprockets are not properly aligned; 
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• The chain is incorrectly tensioned (requirement could be seen in Table 1); 
For electric motors, reliability relies not only on robust system design, but also tolerance of 
harsh environment, which may bring in threat of short circuiting, earth isolation fault or bad 
connection of circuit joints. Things like these easily occur in environment with water, dust 
and unclean floor. Protection against these unexpected conditions is always a challenge for 
engineers who spend most of the time in clean and tidy office. Contamination in circuit board 
is less invisible and hard to detect. Regular inspection is required for these kind of potential 
failure modes. And material deterioration like breakage of motor case, hose, valve, rotor, and 
stator could all contribute to the malfunctioning of motor. 
The link-belt chain drive needs proper and regular maintenance to deliver satisfying 
performance and service life. The failure of chain, sprockets, or misalignment could all cause 
the transmission and drawwork system to fail. As described in API specification 7F, the chain 
part may get cracked, broken, deformed or corroded due to long time usage in dusty and 
moisture environment (API 2003). Visual inspection could be an important and necessary 
part of maintenance strategy to discover undergoing failures. Once any of above is found, the 
entire chain is advised to be changed even though the other parts still look in good condition. 
Mistakes might be made at this point for not following the suggested replacement policy. 
Similar problems probably are in progress and failure may happen soon. Sprockets need also 
to be checked and changed if necessary when new chains are utilized in the system, or else 
chain wears out quickly. 
Excessive noise during operation might indicate a too large chain pitch, sprockets 
misalignment, excessive chain slack, loose shaft mounts or insufficient lubrication. Ignorance 
of uncommon noise may gradually lead to failure of chain/ sprockets parts, which plays a 
critical role in transmission system. The loss of any of them will definitely cause failure of 
the whole system. Wearing of thickness of link-plate, if beyond 5% (API 2003), or wearing 
of sprocket tooth thickness, if beyond 10%, will lead to misalignment of sprocket. The 
sprockets need to be replaced immediately to avoid its impact on the whole system.  
Table 17 Critical failures and maintenance practice on power transmission system 
Critical failures Recommended maintenance program 
Short/open circuit Corrective maintenance (fail safe) 
Breakage of motor case/rotor/stator/chain Corrective maintenance 
Leakage of valve/hose Predictive maintenance (visual) 
Insufficient tensioning of chain Predictive maintenance (visual) 
Lube oil condition Predictive maintenance (oil analysis) 
 
4) Control system: 
Control system includes driller’s control system and drawwork control system, including 
hoisting and lowering operation control, braking system control and anti-collision control. 
Most control commands are sent from driller’s control console. The control system is based 
on and managed with the use of PLC. All control signals are electrical signals. In this case, 
hoisting, braking and parking are controlled through pneumatic control system (Figure!30). 
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In the pneumatic control system, valves, tanks, regulators, hoses, and actuators are the normal 
components. Failure of components/ instrumentations, short circuit, or cooling failure could 
all contribute to the failure of control system. Critical consequences maybe among the 
following: 
• Overweight on drilling bits.  
• Fall/ collision of travelling block  
• Damage of well due to fast hoisting speed (Mortensen 1984) 
Pressured gas is stored in a tank, where pressure is usually compressed to thousands of 
pounds per square inch (PSI). The strength of the tank is approved by DNV-GL in this case. 
Regulators are used to reduce the highly pressurized gas to a more manageable pressure. It is 
normally installed beside the tank when there is a need of pressure drop in another part of the 
pneumatic control system. Hoses are used to deliver the pressurized gas. The hoses are 
normally reinforced with steel wires to keep them strong enough to stand up with the inner 
pressure. Choices of valves are also sensitive to pressurized gas. The price of valves for high-
pressure usage will be usually higher. If there is a pressure difference between input and 
output of valve, the higher pressure will be used as a reference to the choice of valves. The 
stopping and starting of the flow depend on open and close operation of the fast-response 
valve. Valves could be operated manually or remotely using motors and electronics. With all 
pneumatic control components in position, actuators are as hands to human. The final actions 
are executed by the actuators. Actuator is normally a cylinder with a disk and a rod inside. 
The high-pressure gas enters into the house of the actuator, force the disk to move, and thus 
push the rod with which other objects could be connected to move. Different actions could be 
achieved by facilitating certain actuators. An accepted response of pneumatic system is a 
result of cooperation of all these functional components.  
Loss of control of pneumatic system might lead to overweight on drilling bits, or even fall/ 
collision of travelling block. Many causes could lead to the failure or reduced capacity of 
hoisting. As described above, pressurized air is transmitted in the system. Longtime exposure 
to high pressure air might lead to leakage on weak points of the system, probably valve joints 
or hose connections. Another incident that might lead to loss of control of pneumatic system 
is dew formation. The compressed air is normally dried before use. However, dew formation 
could still happen in particular condition, which may cause faulty operations of controls 
(Compressed air& gas institute). When things are not solved and may become more serious 
and no complementary measures are executed, hoisting/braking capacity will be reduced as a 
result. If this happens in lowering operation, the reduced capacity to hold the drilling pipes 
will add overweight to the end of the drilling pipes, which is drilling bit. Although weight on 
the bit could be read on the instruments, the response to hoisting the drilling pipes no longer 
involves enough hoisting force that is needed to reduce the weight on bits as it used to be. 
Drilling bits will be facing with over-worn or breakage. Drilling pipes are also facing a 
possibility of breakage. 
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Figure'30'Pneumatic control system (Dreco 1994) 
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If things happen in lowering operation of BOP package to the well bore, a fall-down of 
travelling block might be the consequence in the worst situation. The accident of Deepwater 
Pathfinder occurred on Exxon Corporation’s Atwater Valley Block 116 in the Gulf of Mexico 
could be an example of importance of control of braking system (Gorden 2000). The accident 
is not caused by the loss of control on pneumatic/ hydraulic system, but misunderstanding of 
control philosophy. The operation sequence is not totally understood by driller or other 
operators. The incorrect operating sequence induced the unsuccessful engagement of motor-
driven hoisting system. And overheat on brake disc caused the whole braking system to fail. 
The catastrophic failure caused approximately 20 million USD economic losses according to 
MMS report (David el at 1999). 
Similar failures might show up during hoisting operation. Normally automatic crown safety 
device is installed on drawworks drum to avoid possible collision between travelling block 
and the crown block. A possible device is called Crown-O-Matic. A toggle valve is installed 
on a track above drum of drawworks. It is actuated by another line being binded onto the 
drum.  The drum clutch is activated when toggle valve is actuated. This will trigger the 
engagement of the mechanical brake. As describe in the accident occurred in Gulf of Mexico 
in 2008 by MMS, a travelling block stuck the crown block with Crown-O-Matic activated 
correctly (MMS 2008). The night driller used high/high gear to hoist drilling tool, which is 
not allowed according to contractor Parker Drilling’s operation procedure. The night driller 
from Chevron did not acknowledge this due to lack of communication with the contractor 
Parker. Besides, the night driller is too concentrated on instrumentations and accidentally 
mistook the third tool joint to be the second joint. The speed of the hoisting is too large for 
the anti-collision device to respond. The Crown-O-Matic did activate but the time is too few 
to stop the TBA.  
Wells with no casing protection are vulnerable to damages (Mortensen 1984). Good control 
of hoisting-up or lowering-down of drilling pipes in area with no casings installed is very 
critical. The speed should be low to avoid the damage to the vulnerable surface of the well 
that has not been protected by cases.  
Table 18 Critical failures and maintenance practice on control system 
Critical failures  Recommended maintenance program 
Instruments failure Corrective maintenance 
Alarm failure Predictive maintenance (visual) 
Pneumatic system failure Predictive maintenance (visual, pressure, 
acoustic) 
Operation error Corrective maintenance (competence 
management) 
HMI system failure/update Preventive maintenance 
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5) Lubrication system: 
The diagram of lubrication system in this case is shown in Figure!31. The oil is pumped from 
oil sump to different locations of chain transmission system. Lubrication oil is transmitted 
through hoses, sprayed by spray bar above chain-belts with control of ball valve, and utilized 
in bearing and shaft contact surface. For main drum shaft, grease are used to lubricate drum 
shaft from grease bank.  
Normally lubrication system could not bring in serious consequence as it is relatively easy to 
detect and takes longer time to propagate into serious accident. However, the debris in oil and 
leakage or system could still be a contribution to over-worn of parts. Overheat of oil, or 
failure of cooling system, could induce to reduced lubrication ability of oil and caused faster 
wearing. 
In this case, there is only one lubrication oil pump and motor. The lack of redundancy might 
be a potential threat of shut-down of the whole system, as it is not acceptable to run the 
system without any lubrication. Short-circuit, high wearing in pump and leakage of pump 
could all contribute to unfunctionality of pump.  
Table 19 Critical failures and maintenance practice on lubrication system 
Critical failures Recommended maintenance program 
Loss of integrity in lubrication system 
(pump, oil tank, filter, hose) 
Corrective maintenance 
Lubrication oil property/contamination Predictive maintenance (oil analysis) 
Stuck of spray hole Preventive maintenance 
Leakage of lubrication system Predictive maintenance (visual) 
 
6) Supporting system: 
Supporting system includes frames, case and seats. The quality is approved by DNV-GL in 
this case. NDT inspection is done in every 5 years to confirm the strength of all critical 
supporting system. There is normally no critical consequence induced by failure of 
supporting system. 
Table 20 Critical failures and maintenance practice on supporting system 
Critical failures Recommended maintenance program 
Crack/ breakage of derrick/case/seat Preventive maintenance 
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 Figure'31'Lubrication schematic (Dreco 1994) 
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3.4 Failure mode and symptom analysis (FMSA) 
To illustrate drawworks in terms of functionality breakdown, drawworks is consisted of five 
main subsystems (Abouamin et al. 2003): Mechanical system, Variable speed drive system 
(VSDS), Power management system (PMS), Driller’s control system (DCS), Drawworks’s 
control system (CS), which are shown in Figure 32: 
 
 
Figure 32 Block diagram of drawworks (Abouamin et al. 2003) 
The FMSA table mentioned in former part of the thesis is recommended by ISO 13379 (ISO 
13379, 2002), and for the better adaptation to the case, a modified FMSA table is introduced 
shown as below (Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33 FMSA table (Adapted from ISO13379 2002) 
In the FMSA analysis, failure mode, failure mechanism, and cause of failure is analyzed 
within the scope ISO 14224 defines (ISO 14224, 2006). Like before, consultant companies or 
company risk analysis department comes up with their own definition for failure modes, 
failure mechanism, and cause of failure. This normally ends up with complexities of analysis 
result. By classifying these core outputs within the ISO 14224 definition (Appendix C, D, E), 
a more structured outcome could be shown, and further studies from the FMSA analysis will 
be clearer and easier. Single failure of each component of the whole system will induce some 
impact on local system, and it might also have potential effect on the whole system. The 
shutdown of the whole system or threat to human safety is not acceptable, and should have 
the highest value of MPN, which equals=DET*SEV*DGN*PGN. In the research, the main 
outcome is to reveal the most critical failure modes (could list the ranking also if needed) by 
ranking the MPN value. The higher the value is, the more critical it will be for condition 
monitoring priorities.  
For DET, SEV, DGN, and PGN, the higher the value is, a better detectability, more critical 
severity, easier diagnostic, and easier prognostic will be. The value all ranks from 1 to 5. The 
value, as stated in the chapter 2.3.1, is given by the author with consideration of literature, 
experience, and company practice. And the most critical system will then be identified from 
the ranking of the value of MPN. 
The full FMSA table could be checked in Appendix B. 
System Sub-system Fuction or process Failure syptoms 
Failure 
mode 
(ISO 
14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of failure 
(ISO 14224)
Local failure 
effect
System 
failure effect DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=
DET*
SEV*
DGN*
PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
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3.4.1 Mechanical system 
Mechanical system includes the supporting system, drum assembly, clutch assembly, 
transmission system, pneumatic system, lubrication system and mechanical brake assembly. 
Mechanical system is the basis for the whole system. Ignorance of mechanical failure might 
lead to essential systematic failure. The most critical single failure modes could be drawn out 
from FMSA analysis. The most critical failure modes are listed below according to MPN 
value from FMSA: 
Table 21 Critical failure symptoms for mechanical system 
Component/ 
sub-system Failure symptoms MPN 
Component/ 
sub-system Failure symptoms MPN 
Drum Fast wearing of brake discs 320 Main shafts Overheat 240 
Drum Breakage of wireline 320 
Pneumatic 
system 
Calipers do not 
respond 240 
Drum Brake power is not enough 320 
Pneumatic 
system 
Pressurized air 
tank failure 240 
Pneumatic 
system 
Brake funcions 
improperly 320 
Pneumatic 
system Wrong indication 240 
Mechanical 
brake 
components 
Breakage 320 Pneumatic system 
Leakage in closed 
space 240 
Lubrication 
system 
No rise in 
pressure 320 
Pneumatic 
system 
No response to 
control signal 240 
Pneumatic 
system 
Internal dew 
formation in 
pneumatic system 
256 
Mechanical 
brake 
components 
Big gap between 
brakes discs and 
bands 
240 
Drum 
Breakage/ 
buckling of drum 
barrel 
240 
Mechanical 
brake 
components 
Overheat 240 
 
The derrick tower gives the support of travelling block and crown block. The deformation of 
tower will definitely lead to failure of hoisting system. The whole operation will have to be 
stopped due to serious lack of integrity. This might be a result of fatigue, corrosion, or 
overweight during hoisting. Failure of drum assembly, in form of drum barrel breakage/ 
buckling, shaft breakage/ buckling, or wire line breakage, will lead to the failure of 
drawworks. This will force the operation to be shut down.  
For pneumatic system, internal dew might form due to circumstance temperature change or 
overload. The dew will have a bad impact on electronics, valves and other components in the 
air transmission channel, which will lead to the decreased performance or total failure of 
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pneumatic system. The response time of clutching or braking might be influenced or lost. 
This will directly reduce the operation efficiency of hoisting operation. If the pneumatic 
system fails totally, that will trigger the utilization of emergency braking system. Unexpected 
stop of operation will come along, which induces longer down time and great economic loss. 
The unexpected stop from pneumatic system could also be from the failure of serious leakage 
in hoses/ valves. Besides, breakage/ serious leakage of pressurized air tank will cause the 
depressurization of the whole pneumatic system, which will lead to the engagement of 
emergency braking system. This will lead to unexpected stop of operation too. 
For mechanical brake components, serious wearing of brakes, too big air gap between brake 
disc and band, or breakage of brake disc will lead to the failure of braking system. As 
emergency braking system uses the same brake discs as parking service braking system does, 
the failure of mechanical brake components will lead to the drop of load, which will bring 
great threat to human safety, structure damage and environment issues. 
 
 
3.4.2 Variable speed drive system 
Variable speed drive system includes converter, power units, cooling system, and operator 
interface. If converter fails to convert the frequency/voltage as needed, the unstable input of 
electric motor will lead to decreased efficiency of operation. Short/ open circuit, or failure of 
electronics might lead to failure of converter, the lack of power input of motor will direct lead 
to engagement of emergency braking system as its failsafe philosophy defines. This will 
bring in unexpected stop of operation. 
Table 22 Critical failure symptoms for speed drive system 
Component/ 
sub-system Failure symptoms MPN 
Component/ 
sub-system Failure symptoms MPN 
Converter Fail to start 240 Converter 
Failure to convert 
frequency and 
voltage as needed 
192 
Operator 
interface 
Loss of critical 
signals sent to 
and from the 
VSDS 
240 Power unit Unstable power flow 192 
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3.4.3 Power management system 
Power management system includes driving motors and other electrical components. There 
are two electric motors and each of them is capable of providing enough driving power to 
hoisting. The two motors design offers the redundancy and therefore robustness and 
reliability. Failure of one motor will have no impact on the system as a whole, as redundant 
motor could still work to provide driving power. Due to wearing, inadequate clearance, or 
unstable voltage input, the motor might output unstable driving force. This might threat the 
safety and efficiency of hoisting/ lowering operation.  
Table 23 Critical failure symptoms for power management system 
Component/ 
sub-system 
Failure 
symptoms MPN 
Component/ 
sub-system 
Failure 
symptoms MPN 
Driving 
motors (with 
redundancy) 
Unstable power 
output 320 
Driving 
motors (with 
redundancy) 
No power/ 
voltage 192 
Driving 
motors (with 
redundancy) 
Failure of one 
motor 192 
Driving 
motors (with 
redundancy) 
Faulty power/ 
voltage 192 
Driving 
motors (with 
redundancy) 
High reading 
from 
temperature 
instrument 
192    
 
3.4.4 Driller’s control system 
Driller’s control system includes operator’s control chair, multi-tool control cabinet, and 
operator workstations. The interactions between human and machine could be achieved 
through joystick and control cabinet. Failure of joystick will not have influence on the whole 
system due to redundancy. Fail to respond on command is in scope of control failure, and this 
might be induced by short/ open circuit, or instrument failure. This will threat the safety of 
hoisting/ lowering operation, and drop of load might happen in the worst case. Besides, as the 
system is mainly human-machine interaction, operation error (management error) could be an 
input to the delayed operation. Critical signals/ alarms might be missed due to carelessness or 
limited attention. This could be very severe at the time of emergency. Absence of response 
might induce collision of travelling block or drop of load in the worst situation. 
Table 24 Critical failure symptoms for driller’s control system 
Component/ sub-system Failure symptoms MPN 
 Multi-Tool Control Cabinet Failure to response on command 320 
 Multi-Tool Control Cabinet Loss of critical signals sent to and from driller's control system 240 
 Multi-Tool Control Cabinet No signal 240 
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3.4.5 Drawworks control system 
Drawworks control system includes critical sensors, alarms, main drawworks control system 
(PLC), and emergency stop system. Failure of any critical sensor, in form of lack of 
adjustment or faulty indication, might threat the hoisting/ lowering safety.  
Table 25 Critical failure symptoms for drawwork control system 
Component/ 
sub-system 
Failure 
symptoms MPN 
Component/ 
sub-system 
Failure 
symptoms MPN 
Main 
drawworks 
control system  
Switch failure 320 
Main 
drawworks 
control system  
Loss of critical 
signals sent to 
and from 
driller's 
control system 
240 
Main 
drawworks 
control system  
Failure to 
response on 
command 
320 
Main 
drawworks 
control system  
No signal 240 
Critical sensors 
Abnormal 
reading from 
sensors 
240 Emergency stop Failure of braking 240 
Alarms False alarm 240 Emergency stop Failure of braking 225 
Alarms 
Travelling block 
position 
reference failure 
240    
 
For alarms, the anti-collision alarm’s failure will put the operator’s visual confirmation to be 
final safe guard against collision. This will put great threat on the safety of facility. Similarly, 
spurious high/ low alarm level could also be an input to decreased reliability/ safety. If the 
alarm level is too high, the alarm will come along at a far more dangerous condition. The 
facility and human lives are already put in danger for a while. If the alarm level is too low, 
this will just induce more downtime due to fake alarms. 
For main drawworks control system, Fail to respond on command is in scope of control 
failure, and this might be induced by short/ open circuit, or instrument failure. This will threat 
the safety of hoisting/ lowering operation, and drop of load might happen in the worst case. 
Critical signals/ alarms might be missed due to carelessness or limited attention. This could 
be very severe at the time of emergency. Absence of response might induce collision of 
travelling block or drop of load in the worst situation. 
For emergency stop design part, the failure of brake discs, in form of serious wearing, 
breakage of brake disc, or too big clearance between brake disc and band, will cause the 
failure of emergency stop. The emergency stop control is actually mechanical triggered with 
the setting of releasing spring when pressure/ power is off. The failure of spring will cause 
the failure of emergency stop function. The consequence will be the drop of load, great threat 
to human safety and huge economic loss. 
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4 Fault tree analysis on critical failure modes of Drawworks 
(case study) 
In this chapter, FTA will be built by the author based on all critical failure modes identified 
from chapter 3 (as basic events of FTA). FTA is the core basis for further discussion on data 
management and decision making process on maintenance notificaitons. It is recommended 
by the author to work as one of the referece to check consequence criticaility on potential 
failures, and FTA contributes to data management in decision-making procedure. 
4.1 Principles of building FTA models in this case 
The company is trying to build a data architecture that combines condition-monitoring data 
and at the same time optimize decision support system. Fault tree analysis is a proper risk 
analysis tool to achieve the goal. As describe earlier in chapter 2, the top-down structure of 
FTA and its failure cause analysis nature fit well to the main purpose of the research. The 
decision structures could also be interpreted through data and decision-making management 
related to different levels of FTA. 
FTA starts from the critical failure modes analyzed from hazard identification in chapter 3. 
The occurrence of different basic events might lead to sub-system failure, and this might 
propagate to more serious failure of higher level of system. From the FMSA analysis in 
chapter 3, it is recognizable that which system is critical for FTA analysis through the 
average value of MPN. For the FMSA table in Appendix B, pneumatic system and electric 
motors (power management system) are read as the most critical system in the drawworks 
system. And in the end, an overall fault tree analysis will be done to reveal the main concerns 
that might lead to operation shutdown or serious safety issues.  
4.2 FTA on critical systems 
The definition of critical systems is those systems, where failures will have the greatest 
impact on the whole system. Here in this thesis, systems with the highest MPN value read 
from FMSA table are the most critical systems. As the purpose in thesis is to define critical 
data sources to assist decision-making from condition monitoring technologies, only 
measurable factors will be included here in this part. That is to say, mechanical parts instead 
of management parts are the targets of FTA analysis. Critical control/management system 
will still be discussed, but no in form of FTA. According to FMSA table in Appendix B, 
pneumatic system, electric motors, drum assembly and frequency converter are classified as 
the most critical measurable system (shown in Table 26), where frequency converter 
determines the frequency and voltage of input power to electric motors and thus will be 
analyzed together. And critical control systems are discussed along with critical mechanical 
system (here refers to pneumatic system, and electric motors). For some critical component 
like drum with average MPN value at 267, will be discussed along with FTA for overall 
drawworks.  
Fault tree analysis in this project will be implemented on component/sub-system level. 
Further failure mechanism on part level of each sub-system will not be discussed further, as 
no condition monitoring technique is going to be implemented on such detailed component, 
and failure statistics in OREDA does not cover so many details. For example, only failure of 
stator instead of its failure causes will be discussed.  
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Table 26 Selection of the most critical systems 
System Pneumatic system Electric motors Drum Frequency converter 
MPN 202 187 267 204 
4.2.1 Pneumatic system of drawworks 
The diagram of pneumatic system could be checked in Appendix A. Pneumatic system in this 
case works as the drive to engage clutch and braking system. Failure of pneumatic system 
may display mainly as three modes: fail to start clutch, fail to start brake, and unexpected 
braking. The reason could generally be categorized as mechanical failure and control failure.  
Fail of pneumatic system might induce the failure to start clutch. It might be the total failure 
to engage low/high clutch or slow response to control command. Basic events that might 
induce the mechanical failure in this scenario include clutch breakage, air tank failure, air 
hose breakage, valve failure, and regulator failure. The occurrence of these basic events 
breaks the consistence of power transmission chain inside the pneumatic system. Fail to 
engage braking system is similar situation while emergent braking system is designed to be 
engaged once parking service system fails. The simultaneous failure of all redundant braking 
system might happen due to failure from pneumatic system. For emergent braking system, 
the loss of pressure inside pneumatic system will trigger the engagement of emergent braking 
through a spring. The occurrence of these two events at the same time will induce the failure 
of braking. 
For control system failure of pneumatic system, instruments, signal transmission, airflow rate, 
pressure control and power input could all prompt failure of pneumatic system. Internal dew 
formation is a great threat for pneumatic driven system. It could be the cause for many kinds 
of failures, like component corrosion, reduced inner pressure, vibration, and delayed response. 
As pressure and temperature are critical aspects in pneumatic system, failures from these 
instruments will put great threat on safe and reliable operation of pneumatic system as well as 
the whole drilling operation. 
FTA for pneumatic system is shown in Figure 34. 
4.2.2 FTA of Electric motors for drawworks 
Power generation system for drawworks in this case is designed with redundancy. Either of 
the two motors could provide enough driving force for the operation. The loss of both two 
motors will end up failure of electric motors system. Failures on electric motor may display 
as no power output, and unstable power output.  
No power output could be induced by either spurious stop, or failure to start. The causes 
include material degradation, leakage, power input, and control failure. Material degradation 
on case, stator, coupling, rotor will end up with loss of integrity of motor. The degradation 
maybe too serious for the actuator to engage the motor properly. Unstable power output 
might be induced as a result of misalignment of rotating component. And lubrication oil 
property might accelerate wearing on the rotating part of motor, which will worsen the 
situation. Electric circuit induced connection looseness, short circuit, and open circuit might 
cause failure on motors too. Besides, converter error, operation error and other human factors 
might be hidden causes for spurious stop of motor. Detailed FTA analysis on electric motors 
is shown in Figure 35. 
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4.2.3 FTA for overall drawworks system 
Fault tree for overall drawworks is established based on the most critical failure modes 
identified from chapter 3. The top event for drawworks failure is here defined as loss of 
production. It could be induced by loss of redundant of safety, reduced efficiency, or loss of 
integrity. And different failures on lower level of system might have potential to propagate to 
system failure. 
Loss of redundancy of safety means the system will face immediate threat without safety 
redundancies. When drawworks is implementing hoisting or lowering work, or the load is 
dropping unexpected, there is a need to engage the braking system for control of speed or 
position. Loss of braking system together with loss of hoisting/lowering control, will 
introduce great threat on safety of installing as well as human life. Firstly, fail to engage 
braking system might be a result from mechanical failure and control failure. Large air gap 
between brake band and disc, and breakage of disc, drum flange, caliper might contribute to 
braking system’s failure. Pneumatic system, as discussed above, is another main contributor 
for braking system failure. Besides, control failure from operation error, signal transmission, 
instrument failure, and alarm failure have chances to induce braking failure. Secondly, loss of 
control of hoisting/lowering might be a result of motors driving system failure, mechanical 
failure, or control failure. The motors and pneumatic failure propagation could be referred to 
chapter 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Other mechanical failures might induce failure of control of 
hoisting/lowering, like chain transmission system failure, wire line breakage, drum failure, 
and clutch failure.  
Loss of operation efficiency might be a result from electric failure, unexpected engagement 
of braking, or decreased efficiency of transmission system. For sake of safety guarantee, 
emergent braking system is designed to be engaged automatically at the loss of 
power/pressure. However, production is halted no matter it is triggered for safety protection 
or operation/control error. The propagation process for this scenario could be found in FTA 
for pneumatic system (P2 branch of FTA). What’s more, wearing of chain transmission 
system will result in low efficiency of power transmission. Contamination, insufficient 
lubrication, or fatigue might be reasons for the wearing. 
Mechanical failure, poor data management, lack of competence, or lack of spare parts could 
all the reasons for loss of integrity. Due to expensive logistic and limited space on spare parts 
as well as staff in offshore operation, shortage of necessary operation elements will just bring 
in more risk of reliable operation. Downtime will be increased if anything on these occurs. 
Besides, support structure failure, shaft breakage, drum barrel breakage, or tiedown anchor 
failure would break the integrity of hoisting system, which will halt the production 
immediately. 
The FTA figure for overall drawwork system could be checked in Figure 36. 
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Figure 34 FTA of pneumatic system 
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Figure 35 FTA of Electric motors 
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Figure 36 FTA for overall drawworks 
π"
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4.3 Reliability analysis with Birnbaum’s importance mearsure 
4.3.1 Limitations  
Reliability analysis is supposed to provide a quantitative method to examine the consequence 
criticality of single component’s failure. When there is a decision situation when failure 
happens, stakeholders could use its importance measure as a reference to assess the need of 
maintenance.  
However, drawworks is not involved in OREDA, the overall system level importance 
measure could not be done in the project due to lack of data. Electric motors is the only sub-
system of drawworks that is recorded in OREDA database. And only maintainable items 
should be included in the database, which means present reliability analysis could only be 
done on these components in the thesis. Those parts that are not included in OREDA 
database will not be analyzed in this project. 
Electric motors are just chosen as the example to elaborate the methodology to implement 
reliability analysis based on FTA analysis. As the FTA model is already built, failure 
probability for all basic events could be assigned according to company practice or third 
party recommendations in the future scope of work. 
4.3.2 Calculation 
Birnbaum’s importance measure, as a well-known sensitivity analysis method, is chosen to 
calculate each component’s importance value from FTA. It is quite appropriate to use in 
operation phase in oil production where each action is related to operaton and maintenance 
parameters (Aven 1992). Due to limited reliability data, the calculation is only done in one 
system just to show how to make this kind of analysis.  
The equation of Birnbaums’s importance measure is: !!! = ℎ 1! ,! − ℎ 0! ,! !!!!(!"#$%&'(!1969) 
where, p is the system reliability at the time the analysis is implemented, q is the system 
unreliability, ℎ(1! ,!) is the reliability of the system when component number i is in its best 
condition, and ℎ(0! ,!) is the reliability of the system when component number is fails to 
function. 
Refer to FTA shown in Figure 35 in chapter 4.2.2, simplified FT (logically simplified for 
easy calculation) could be drawn as Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37 Simplified Fault tree for electric motors 
! -73- 
A reliability block diagram could be developed according to the fault tree, shown as Figure 
38. 
 
Figure 38 Reliability diagram for Electric motors 
According to OREDA database, reliability data could be read or calculated as shown below, 
in Table 27. For the importance calculation, failure of bearing A is independent from failure 
of bearing B. 
Table 27 Reliability calculation results with Birnbaum's importance measure, as an example 
Maintainable 
items/ 
functionality 
Failure rate 
(per 10^6 
hours) 
MTTF MTTR Unavailability Importance measurement 
Bearing 4.128 242247 1.4 5.78E-06 0,000308867 
Hose/pipe 0.458 2183329 2.6 1.19E-06 0,000308865 
Short circuit 0.916 1091665 7.5 6.87E-06 0,000308867 
Open circuit 0.458 2183329 7.3 3.344E-06 0,000308866 
Earth fault 0.916 1091665 6.7 6.137E-06 0,000308867 
Instrument 
failure 10.094 99069 15.3 1.544E-04 0,000308913 
Alignment 
failure 0.916 1091665 5.1 4.672E-06 0,000308866 
Oil property 
change 0.916 1091665 4.2 3.847E-06 0,000308866 
Wiring 
failure 3.67 272480 29.9 1.097E-04 0,000308899 
Stator failure 1.374 727777 9.5 1.305E-05 0,000308869 
From Table 27, Instrument failure is the most critical component that has the most 
importance to the electric motor system. similar analysis could be done on overall system 
level to check the most critical component/system, while failure data needs to be defined 
properly. 
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4.3.3 Automatic calculation of importance measure 
If reliability data could be assigned on each level of fault tree, the utilization of professional 
FTA software like RiskSpectrum will greatly improve the availability of component’s 
importance measurement values. Through the use of profession al FTA software, modeling of 
FTA of very complex system becomes possible. Further development from the model is 
relatively easier and available for even not professionals, which is of great help in decision 
support system. 
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5 Decision-making practice on maintenance notifications (case 
study) 
In this chapter, maintenance management principles in the company will be explained at the 
beginning. The explanation would be specified in drawworks and should be possible to be 
extended to overall maintenance management practice. The present decision-making practice 
is established with standards, the company’s own practice, advice from DNV-GL and 
industry’s best practice. Technical integrity is already the basis of the decision-making 
process. With the above analysis in the thesis, a data architecture could be developed and it 
allows different decision makers to react to maintenance needs with comprehensive and 
necessary data, which present decision making practice lacks. Besides, wider and deeper 
technical integrity insight is suggested to be incorporated into the recommended decision-
making practice on maintenance notifications.  
5.1 Present maintenance management on drawworks (case study) 
5.1.1 Target group and responsibilities 
For the company studied in this thesis, maintenance management on drawworks is 
implemented with collaboration of offshore operation and maintenance teams and onshore 
technical teams. Sometimes, some of the maintenance work is outsourced to professional 
technical service provider. Mainly, they work very closely with company’s engineers. For 
different sections, different responsibilities are assigned. The main target group and 
responsibilities are described below according to the company’s maintenance management 
principle brochure.  
Offshore operation and maintenance team is mainly consisted of technicians. Their work is 
mainly to implement operation and maintenance work, and keep the production going as 
expected. The offshore O&M team work in the very front line of the production activities. 
They get a chance to notice miner anomalies and respond accordingly. The main job 
responsibilities are listed in Table 28.  
Table 28 Responsibility of offshore team 
Functions of Offshore operations and maintenance team 
Overall responsibility for all equipment (including drawworks) and all activities on board 
Installation’s budget 
Prioritizing and managing activities on board 
Planning and execution of maintenance activities 
Facilitating execution of operations and maintenance activities 
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Onshore facility team is consisted of operation engineer, maintenance engineer and discipline 
engineer. The team cooperates with offshore O&M team as the first decision making level for 
maintenance notifications. Once facility team gets maintenance notifications from offshore 
team (could be from onshore CM engineers too, for example) for further assistance, facility 
team will assess the notifications, and register priority and resources needed in SAP if no 
further review or assessment is not needed. The functions of facility team is described in 
Table 29. 
Table 29 Responsibility of facility engineers 
Functions of onshore facility team 
Ensure the quality of maintenance notifications of draworks that arrive from offshore, so that 
the maintenance engineer has an optimum basis for planning activities in a wider range; 
Allocate notifications/orders for technical evaluation, internal planning and execution, 
planning and implementation by modification contractors or for execution by offshore 
personnel; 
Prioritize notifications/orders in collaboration with offshore, and follow progress on planning 
and technical evaluation; 
Planning work orders; 
Budgetary control; 
Monitor non-conformity situations and time limits (required end dates) for maintenance 
activities; 
Register information in SAP in agreement with offshore units; 
Prioritize as to which work orders shall be planned for execution in the ensuing months; 
Ensure that preventive maintenance is executed as planned; 
Prioritize maintenance activities to ensure a minimum of risk; 
Shall always have control on backlog; 
Evaluate proposals for optimization together with project manager responsible, so that 
preventive maintenance is adjusted in accordance with the equipment’s technical condition. 
 
Once further assessment needs to be made on maintenance notifications, facility engineer, 
discipline engineers or technical safety experts will assess the need of maintenance work, and 
come up with solutions. Normally, engineers could solve the problem from their own 
competences, and could also get advices from both original equipment manufacturer and 
third party risk & safety consultant. The main responsibilities of engineers are listed in Table 
30. 
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Table 30 Responsibilities of engineers 
Functions in engineering 
Evaluate of notifications; 
Ensure that projects deliver an appropriate maintenance program and that the right 
maintenance strategy has been selected; 
Ensure that changes/updates in standards are incorporated in the maintenance program; 
Organize field-wide disciplines forums with a view to improve/optimized maintenance and to 
establish best practice; 
Administer and optimize maintenance programs in SAP; 
Managing maintenance to secure an acceptable condition of the safety functions and to 
achieve acceptable equipment availability; 
Systematically gathering and organizing maintenance data so as to identify potential 
improvement areas, and implement improvements within the maintenance function; 
Communicate potential consequences of any backlogs and remaining maintenance work and 
the need to prioritize in the activities management offshore. 
Work orders from all parties will be gathered in SAP system. All work orders are predefined 
with priorities and RED. IPC, with help of some planning tools, will make a 14 days work list 
based on each work’s priority and required end date. Planning of logistics is also part of 
IPC’s work scope. To keep logistic efficiency is a challenge, and to make logistic suitable for 
platform storage and capacity could be more challenging. The responsibilities of IPC are 
listed in Table 31. 
Table 31 Responsibilities of IPC 
Functions in the integrated planning center (IPC) 
Organize and facilitate maintenance work offshore (calling out materials, following up 
materials deliverables, dispatching work folders offshore); 
Update execution plans and ensure that logistics facilitate work execution at planned time; 
Establish work collections/networks for shutdown jobs and ensure that the content is limited 
to include genuine shutdown jobs; 
Ensure correct prioritization of work in collaboration with specialized maintenance in the 
event of resource collisions; 
Link bed requests to approve jobs in integrated planning (IPL) and assist heli-booking in 
planning departure plans; 
Analyze integrated medium term plan (MTP) with an aim to manage bed quotas and for 
identification of conflicts/opportunities that cab be handled before short term plans (STP). 
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Engineering has the overall responsibility for the maintenance program. In disciplines where 
facility teams have engineers, they are supposed to be assigned the responsibility for the 
maintenance program. Engineering directors are responsible for implementing the measures 
that have been identified as necessary in order to ensure the best possible maintenance. 
5.1.2 Risk-based maintenance decision 
5.1.2.1 Consequence classification of equipment 
Normally, consequence classification of drawworks is carried out by EPCIC contractor. For 
modification projects on drawworks, the consequence classification is done by the supplier of 
the modification and uploaded to SAP. Every time there is a modification, maintenance 
engineers are responsible for deciding if the existing classification should be retained or not. 
Facility engineer is responsible to ensure that drawworks should not be put into operations 
without consequence classification in SAP. 
The company develops a process to classify consequence of equipment, shown in Figure 39. 
The consequence is ranked and imported into SAP system. It could then be used to establish 
maintenance program, risk evaluation of notifications, planning and prioritization 
maintenance work, and to identify spare parts needs.  
 
Figure 39 Process for consequence classification of equipment (Panesar, Kumar 2015)  !
5.1.2.2 Identification of safety barriers 
As Petroleum safety authority Norway states, safety barriers must be maintained in an 
integrated and consistent manner in order to minimize risk (PSA 2013). Safety barriers are 
groups of equipment/operational and organizational management where the main function is 
to prevent major accidents happening or escalating and, if necessary, assist in the evacuation 
of personnel. All equipment (tag numbers) that is part of a barrier function is considered as 
safety critical equipment and flagged with a code “SFTC” in SAP. The barrier elements must 
be made clear in the risk assessments. 
For measurable technical barrier system on drawworks, the company defines five technical 
barriers to ensure that any potential major accidents are stopped at the earliest possible stage, 
which are: 
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1) Leakage prevention.  
• Containment, inspection of piping and static process equipment 
2) Ignition prevention 
• Gas detection systems (manual, automatic) 
• Disconnection of ignition source (Shut off ignition source, Disconnection of EX 
motors in case of overheating) 
• EX (spark insulation on electrical equipment) protection 
• Overpressure protection (room) 
3) Restriction of energy supply 
• Emergency shut down, ESDV 
• Emergency stop handle/ pedal 
4) Confine escalation of fire/explosion 
• Fire detection system (manual, automatic) 
• Fire pumps 
• Monitors, Monitors with automatic release 
• CO2-system 
• Water mist system, Sprinkler system 
5) Secure personnel in case of major accidents 
• Emergency power (Emergency generator w/start battery and chargers, UPS / 
Inverters w/batteries and charger) 
• Emergency air compressor including batteries and chargers 
• Passive fire protection (Fire and gas dampers, Fire doors / sliding gates and escape 
hatches) 
Once critical hazards have been identified (chapter 3), elements and functions of barriers 
should be sorted out. Functionality, availability, robustness, response time and triggering 
events need to be analyzed.  
5.1.2.3 Prioritization of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance 
In the company, corrective and preventive maintenance policies are carried out on 
drawworks. Maintenance notifications related to corrective maintenance need to be assessed 
for criticality and probability. The consequence will be evaluated firstly. This consequence 
classification is the basis to start the risk assessment process. Secondly, probability for loss of 
function will be ranked. Failures that have occurred fall into top probability scope. Based on 
the consequence and probability, the matrix indicates risk. The corrective maintenance could 
then be prioritized accordingly. The time limit for rectifying any failures/defects follows from 
the risk matrix. For practical reasons, a longer time could be selected. However, reasons for 
doing so need to be notified, since drawworks is so critical for production operation. 
Compared to corrective maintenance, preventive maintenance is prioritized for critical 
equipment like drawworks. That is to say, for similar criticality or risk concerns, preventive 
maintenance is always preferred to be carried out firstly. Preventive maintenance is arranged 
with the rules shown in Figure 40. There is a basic start date and basic end date for the 
maintenance work, but a tolerance is allowed for the work to be finished at required end date 
(RED) instead of basic end date. The RED is not mentioned in SAP system, while a tolerance 
table could be used to define the RED. Any delays on RED will be processed as non-
conformities. 
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Figure 40 Priority of preventive maintenance activities (Panesar, Kumar 2015) !
5.1.3  Maintenance program and process 
A preventive maintenance program is developed in the company. It is designed as a way to 
create values, gain cost efficiency, and take into consideration of development of drawwork’s 
technical condition as well as others. The program should be based on failure modes and 
failure causes for certain equipment, and should include activities that help prevent these 
failure modes. Where effective and cost-efficient, CBM should be preferred. Barrier systems 
for safety operation of drawworks should be maintained so that they could carry out their 
hoisting/lowering/parking function all the time to improve reliability.  
When there are maintenance needs on drawwoks, assessment of those needs, and further on 
planning and execution of maintenance will be carried out sequentially. The process for 
assessment could be checked out in Figure 41. 
The work order of maintenance program is generated by SAP automatically. Maintenance of 
drawworks will be assessed with other maintenance needs and ranked according to criticality 
and probability of occurrence. However, there are always new inputs to this work order. Once 
the assessment procedure is finished, planning of maintenance activities should be done in a 
way of continuous improvement and modification (Figure 42). It would not be cost efficient 
to implement modification/maintenance ever time there is need. Some other work could have 
been dealt with together or done simultaneously to optimize downtime to make maintenance 
more efficient. Or failure of drawwork is not so serious, or on an early propagation stage, 
maintenance work could be done in the controlled future with other preventive maintenance 
work.  
After preparation of maintenance activities, the available material, tools and work packaged 
need to be checked if they are for the actual jobs or not. The execution of maintenance work 
will follow steps shown in Figure 43. 
To ensure continuous improvement of the maintenance program, reporting proposals for 
changes in the preventive maintenance program is required. This occurs when the 
maintenance order is closed and there are proposals for changes to the maintenance program, 
or there is new input. For corrective maintenance activities on drawworks, the need for 
changes in present maintenance program and spare parts availability will be evaluated and 
updated with the implementation of the maintenance program. Critical parts in drawworks 
should be put in higher priority to avoid great productin loss from major failure. For 
preventive maintenance, the interval of execution, necessity of preventive maintenance 
 
 
Barrier testing 
Consequence class in 
SAP=high/ very high 
Consequenc class in SAP= 
medium 
Consequence class in SAP=low/ very low 
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activity, and need to change in program will be assessed continuously during the 
implementation of preventive maintenance program.  
 
Figure 41 Assessment of maintenance notifications (Adapted from Panesar 2015) 
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Figure 42 Planning of maintenance activities (Adapted from Panesar 2015) 
 
Figure 43 Execution of maintenance activities (Adapted from Panesar 2015) 
Work orders generated from SAP system
Critical corrective maintenance
Simplified process for like-for-like replacements
Corrective work order
Modification/ error correction on automation
Integrated planning process
Gathering jobs in package/collaboration
Co-ordinating major maintenance jobs
Sending of material, tools, and work packages
Supervisor with maintennce resonsibilities
Offshore maintenance manager
Correct materials Contact maintenance manager
No Determine if PMO 
should be removed 
from plan
All parties consider the need for SJA
Apply for AT or not
Prior to job, contact area technitian/CCR)
Start work (assessment of maintenance need)
Yes
Yes/approved
Document the PMO that is finished
Return work package to maintenance engineer
If change registered
Final report with changes as an appendix to the PMO
If surplus material left, decide if to return onshore Technical expert, and maintenance manager
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5.2 Recommended inputs of data-driven decision-making practice on 
maintenance notifications  
In this section, with the example of drawwork maintenance, the author will give some 
suggestions on maintenance decision-making process with utilization of comprehensive and 
necessary data. The recommended approach will combine wider range of technical integrity 
concepts compared to current practice. Through the four bases for achieving technical 
integrity, the methodology is explained (Figure 18). 
5.2.1 Competence management: extended responsibilities of different disciplines 
In context of technical integrity, as stated in chapter 2.4.3, contextual data needs to adapted 
into present decision support system in order to improve reliability and operation efficiency. 
The purpose of building-up of the new decision support system aims to allow any levels of 
interventions to have access to contextual data from CM technologies. Contextual data now 
plays a much more important role in the decision making process in response to maintenance 
need in the recommended decision-making practice. 
Based on previous failure modes identification analysis, offshore operator could keep focus 
on the signals that is highlighted in FMSA report, and report anomalies to upper 
management. With the help of ICT, onshore engineers have 100% access to offshore facility 
condition. This ensures not only failure will be reported, but also, data will be collected to the 
maintenance engineer onshore, which could provide feedbacks to offshore operators about 
the signals that might lead to fail. Basically speaking, maintenance notifications could expand 
its sources from mainly offshore to a combination of onshore and offshore (Figure!44). With 
this information, maintenance engineer could join in the maintenance work in an earlier stage 
of possible failure, and offshore operators don’t have to wait the failure to come before 
reporting. By saying so, skill sets for each position/discipline are actually enlarged. Not only 
own business skills are needed, but also the competence to adapt to ever-changing operating 
environment is included. This gives a chance to an evolution of work process, which will be 
discussed in chapter 5.2.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Platform Manager will define the priorities, assess possible HSE and operation risks, and then 
report to Facility Engineer for staff/resources assistance, and technical review. The review 
meeting should be held regularly, for instance once a week. Meanwhile, due to the 
availability and utilization of contextual data onshore, feedback or adjustments requirements 
could be sent to onshore for further analysis in a periodical or continuous way. 
With the maintenance need from offshore engineers, facility engineer could make decision if 
there is no need for further technical assessment. The facility engineers have the access to 
online/offline data too, and any decision will not be made without assessing the consequence 
criticality and possibility of failure. Like before, it is mostly perception of failure from 
knowledge, skills and experience that decision-makers depend on to make decisions. Facility 
Offshore Onshore 
Maintenance notifications 
Figure'44'Sources'of'maintenance'notifications 
Asset integrity team; 
Onshore reliability center 
(CM data analysis); 
Regulations change/update; 
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engineers, as well as technical safety engineers and other stakeholders, need to access and 
assess contextual data to make further decisions or reports. The extended competence should 
also take strategic skill into redefined skill sets, as part of extended competence to assist 
decision making (Figure!45). 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Recommended data architecture on maintaining drawworks 
The body of data architecture mainly includes history records data, operational data, 
maintenance data, risk and reliability calculation, and contextual data from CM techniques. 
Reliability value, here referring to importance measure value from Birnbaum’s measure, will 
be excluded in this part due to unavailability. 
Data during drawwork’s operation and maintenance activities includes all the description data 
of the equipment in its functioning context, maintenance data and failure records. General 
information about drawworks include use/location attributes, equipment attributes and 
operation attributes. The details of these data could refer to Table 11. These data helps to 
identify the specific drawworks and its expected functional condition. In this project’s 
context, contextual data is also included in the data architecture. These data is collected from 
CM techniques in purpose of foreseeing potential failures to improve reliability.  
5.2.2.1 Data collection 
Data collection in this case include history records on drawwork maintenance activities, 
industry database, condition monitoring data and so on. Format and range for recording data 
during maintenance activities could be checked in chapter 2.4.1. For industry database, 
WOAD, OREDA, and HSE failure records could be referred. In this section, condition 
monitoring data collection is discussed specially according to the scope definition of the 
thesis and with consideration of CM utilization. 
For condition monitoring data, the author has introduced many kinds of CM techniques that 
could be/recommended to be used on drawworks, which is discussed in chapter 2.1.2 and 
chapter 3.3. Data from these CM techniques are collected and are not prioritized according to 
risk criticality. The thesis tries to give some suggestion on this part. From Figure 36 FTA for 
overall drawworks, on component level, critical components that lead to potential great 
production loss/safety issue could be identified. The risk criticality could be checked 
according to MPN (Monitoring priority number) value shown in FMSA table in appendix B. 
A list of suggested data sets is shown in Table 32 as an example. 
!
Decision!making!
Skill sets Knowledge 
Experience 
Best practice 
Standards Legislations 
Extended 
competence  
Contextual data 
utilization 
Figure'45'Basis'for'decision'making 
ICT 
Original equipment 
manufacturer advice 
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Table 32 Critical components of drawworks as an example 
No. Component/ functionality 
Failure 
symptom 
Condition 
monitoring 
technique 
Possible 
failure cause Failure effect MPN
1 
1 
DW 
operation 
switch  
Fail to 
function on 
demand 
Visual insp. 
Short/ open 
circuit, or 
earth isolation 
problem 
Fail to 
brake/hoist/lower 
as expected, 
unexpected 
emergency 
braking 
engagement 
320 
2 Wireline Breakage Visual insp., tension sensor 
Fatigue, 
overweight Drop of load 320 
3 Brake band/disc Overheat 
Thermography, 
acoustic 
transducer 
Faulty 
clearance or 
alignment 
Insufficient 
braking, drop of 
load 
240 
  Wearing/ Breakage Visual insp. 
Fatigue, or 
over holding 
weight 
Drop of load 320 
4 Pneumatic system  
Fail to engage 
clutch 
Pressure, 
temperature, 
flow rate, 
acoustic, visual 
insp. 
Leakage, 
wearing 
Delayed 
operation of 
hoisting/lowering 
216 
  Fail to engage brake 
Pressure, 
temperature, 
flow rate, 
acoustic, visual 
insp. 
Leakage, 
wearing Drop of load 320 
5 Drum barrel/flange 
Deformation, 
breakage 
Visual insp. 
Noise, 
radioactive,  
Fatigue, 
overweight 
Shutdown of 
production 267 
6 Main shaft Deformation 
Thermography 
sensor, visual 
insp. 
Overheat due 
to cooling 
system failure 
Shutdown of 
production 240 
7 Alarm Abnormal alarm response Visual insp. 
Alarm level 
too high 
Exposure to 
dangerous 
condition 
240 
  
Fail to trigger 
anti-collision 
alarm 
Visual insp. Alarm failure 
Possible collision 
of TBA and 
crown block 
240 
8 HMI No signal Visual insp. 
Sensor 
failure, wire 
breakage 
Drop of load, 
collision of 
blocks 
240 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!MPN: Monitoring priority number, which develops from FMSA in Appendix B 
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No. Component/ functionality 
Failure 
symptom 
Condition 
monitoring 
technique 
Failure cause Failure effect MPN 
  
Neglect of 
critical 
signals/alarms 
Visual insp. Operator abstraction 
Drop of load, 
collision of 
blocks 
240 
9 Open/short circuit 
No power 
input 
Voltage, 
current, 
Breakage, 
connection 
Unexpected 
emergency 
braking 
engagement 
240 
10 Instrument 
Abnormal 
instrument 
reading 
Thermography, 
vibration, 
pressure sensor, 
etc 
Degradation 
of structure/ 
material 
Threat of 
hoisting/ 
lowering safety 
240 
11 Converter for motors 
Wrong/no 
output Visual insp. 
Short/open 
circuit, 
management 
error 
Unexpected 
emergency 
braking 
engagement 
228 
12 Caliper Slow/ do not respond 
Pressure sensor 
(lube system), 
visual insp. 
Maintenance 
error 
Delayed 
response of 
braking 
192 
13 Clutch Metallic clanking Visual insp. 
Corrosion, 
wear,  
Fail to 
brake/hoist/lower 
as expected 
192 
14 Lubrication system 
Insufficient 
lubrication oil 
supply 
Visual insp. 
Pressure sensor, 
Oil debris 
analysis,  
Leakage due 
to wear, 
breakage, 
connection 
looseness 
Increased 
wearing of power 
transmission  
system 
192 
15 Electric motors 
Failure of two 
motors 
Thermography 
sensor, 
vibration, torque 
detection, 
voltage, current, 
visual insp. 
Overheat, 
open/short 
circuit 
Unexpected 
emergency 
braking 
engagement 
187 
16 Tiedown anchor 
Abnormal 
vibration Visual insp. 
Over weight 
on wireline, 
material 
failure 
Shutdown of 
production 180 
17 Derrick structure 
Abnormal 
vibration Visual insp. 
Over weight 
on wireline, 
material 
failure 
Shutdown of 
production 180 
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5.2.2.2 Recommended data management of drawworks 
Based on present maintenance work order generated from SAP system. New inputs like 
critical corrective maintenance need, inputs from asset integrity and reliability center, and 
changes of operation condition will add new inputs to SAP for IPC to plan. In the author’s 
opinion, the assessment procedure of maintenance notifications should be designed as a 
decision making structure with utilization of necessary data available for each level of 
management/intervention.  
5.2.2.2.1 Contextual data 
The basic events in the FTA indicate the most critical single failures that might lead to loss of 
production (partly or total loss). Any other failures according to this research are either 
considered impossible to happen or has less critical failure effect on the whole system. 
Contextual data/information is available in this level of system. Various condition monitoring 
techniques could be used to collect the real-time data/information.  
Condition monitoring data could be both online and offline. Maintenance engineers will deal 
with the real-time data through ICT system. If automatic diagnose system is available, 
condition could be easier for engineers as well as managements to read. Onshore engineers, 
unlike before, could acknowledge the condition of facilities even earlier than operators 
offshore. Once the data from diagnose system goes abnormal, inspection suggestions could 
be made for operators offshore to implement visual inspection for confirmation, for instance. 
Data analysis based communication between the two parties allows the monitoring of 
facilities to enter into a new reliability level. This adds the source of maintenance needs as 
well. Gladly, the new input of corrective/preventive maintenance provides IPC a more robust 
base to plan maintenance activities.  
For some basic events that do not support online monitoring techniques (for example, brand 
disc wearing, hose leakage, etc) should be monitored manually. The contextual information 
on those most critical components/functionalities is normally inspected by offshore 
technicians. The critical basic events that described in the FTA in Figure 36 are advised to be 
added into present maintenance inspection checklist. And the checklist is suggested to 
combine more information inside, like the failure effect on both local and overall drawworks 
will help the inspectors to react in a better way.  
CM data analysis could indicate the failure probability that is observed to have anomalies 
signals. Combined with criticality of components table in Table 32, priorities of CM as well 
as maintenance activities could be modified accordingly. 
5.2.2.2.2 Risk criticality of failure 
Once anomalies are found in drawworks, FTA propagation diagram (qualitative) and MPN 
values from FMSA analysis could be used as general indications of the criticality of failure 
by decision-makers. This helps the corresponding decision-makers to make a more 
reasonable priority arrangement of maintenance work. As propagation of different basic 
events develop,s different discipline engineers will be involved into the decision making 
structure. Besides this, propagation development adds more clarity of reporting system for 
offshore technicians.  
Birnbaums’s importance measure values (chapter 4.3) could be used to show the reliable 
quantitative analysis of criticality. This allows decision makers to suggest more proper 
inspection plan on the most critical components. If failure is about to happen from diagnose 
analysis, the criticality difference between different maintenance could provide a basis for 
fast decision making classification. Responsibilities of offshore engineers should be defined 
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properly with consideration of availability of time and failure consequence. Fast decision 
making principle is appreciated in today’s business environment. Normally, decision making 
in response with maintenance notificaitons should be done as discussed above. In special 
cases where time is critical, fast decision making by offshore operators should be allowed 
depending on the analysis results from FMSA, FTA, Birnbaum’s importance measure and 
maintenance data as well as contextual data. However, reports to upper management are still 
required to make sure the reliability and awareness of the decision. This could only be done 
with availability of data, readable and understandable data to be precise. This requires the 
utilization of a specially designed data-to-decision interface (future scope of work). 
5.2.2.2.3 Information integration 
Enterprise integration keeps focus on system interconnection, data interchange, data 
exchange and distributed computing environment. It aims to provide the right information at 
the right time and place, and guarantees the efficiency of communication and cooperation 
between people, machine and computer systems (MIMOSA; Vernadat 1996). The integration 
of information/data could provide the organization with the ability of coping with changes as 
well as improving reliability and efficiency in decision-making process. 
To gain information integration, Nell and Kosanke gave some suggestions (Nell and Kosanke 
1997). The author tried to adapt the method to fit this case. The data collection has been 
explained in chapter 2.4.1 and chapter 5.2.2.1. The data should be updated all the time to give 
right indication. With the data available, it is also important set up a reliable ICT system that 
ensures all stakeholders to have access to these data at the right place. The stakeholders could 
be defined according to specific component involved and risk criticality. For example, 
onshore reliability center need to know the condition of the facility and operation to decide if 
and which maintenance engineer or spare parts should be sent to offshore field. This helps to 
build up real-time decision support system (Figure 46). Stakeholder identification in this case 
will be discussed in section 5.2.3. 
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5.2.2.3 Recommended,data,architecture,
Data architecture is built in purpose of providing a basis for further risk analysis and decision 
making. Data sources during drawworks O&M process could be vast. Data is collected both 
from histories and current condition. History data includes experiences, maintenance history, 
industry database, and so on. Current data refers to facility condition, working hours, risk 
analysis-based failure rates, condition monitoring data and so on. A data hub will act as a 
concentration center for all data. The hub should be designed with easy accessibility, 
reliability, and availability. The use of SAP system and reporting system in the company 
could help to achieve the goal. 
Collected data could be divided into two parts, for common use and for specific use. 
Common use data should be available for all stakeholders in the organization. For specific 
use, different disciplines of decision-makers need decision-making related data. Onshore, 
offshore and service providers should be considered into the data architecture system, and 
their accessibility and availability of necessary data should be guaranteed. Data management 
could act as bridge to provide the right information to the right person at the right place. 
Reversely decision-makers should have the competence to utilize necessary data sets to assist 
decision-making and have the accessibility to all relative data. The architecture is shown as 
below in Figure!47. 
!
Figure'47'Recommended'data'architecture'(Adapted'from'Liyanage'2003) 
5.2.3 Recommended decision support system (case study) 
Decision support system in drawworks maintenance decision-making practice includes 
management model, ICT system for information transaction and sharing, knowledge-based 
subsystem, and database management system. The current decision support subsystems work 
in most time independently. The information integration requires an evolution of information 
and knowledge sharing and utilization. The flow of information, based on reliable ICT 
system, should have satisfied precision, cover the right person, and be available at the right 
place. 
Decision-making stakeholders on drawwork maintenance notification are shown in Figure 48. 
As maintenance notifications arise from either offshore or onshore, a decision is required to 
be made if there is a need to report the notification, or if extra engineers or resources are need 
from onshore. Offshore O&M team, and facility team (a group of maintenance engineer, 
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operation engineer, process engineer and discipline engineers) are involved to define the 
priorities and necessity. All the notifications will be sent to IPC for arrangement of 
maintenance work list. This is the first level of decision-making. This fits for most of the 
maintenance notification situations. With the development of decision-making quality, few 
big anomalies happen in offshore operation. Most of the time, maintenance needs could be 
taken good care of without further assistance from onshore. This saves time and money. 
However, it is the IPC’s responsibility to plan when the work should be done due to risk 
criticality and tolerance. To achieve a better reliability on this first decision level, knowledge 
management and data management could be of great help. The relative topics are discussed in 
chapter 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. 
 
Figure 48 Decision-making stakeholders 
If the problem is too complex for facility team to decide, the reported maintenance need from 
both onshore and offshore will be forwarded for technical evaluation. Involved stakeholders 
include discipline engineer, facility engineer, or technical safety staff. Different discipline 
engineer will be involved according to specific maintenance case. Technical safety staff will 
contribute his/her work to reduce maintenance-related risk. The result will be sent to IPC for 
further work list arrangement. This is the second level of decision-making.  
Decisions in either level are suggested to be made based on precise data management (by 
saying precise, it means right information for right person at the right place) and risk analysis. 
Data is collected and analyzed for common or specific use. Condition of equipment could be 
acknowledged, reliability could be calculated, and history records and industry database 
could give indications on occurrence frequency. Meanwhile, risk analysis (here FTA and 
FMSA) has been done in chapter3 and 4, risk criticality for critical failure has been analyzed 
in both qualitative and quantitative way. Risk analysis results could be used to identify the 
data sets that should be collected and analyzed. Reversely, data architecture adds value on 
failure analysis. It allows failure analysis to be more convincing and reliable. Combination 
use of data architecture and risk analysis provides decision-makers a whole picture of the 
decision problem (Figure!49).  
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5.2.4 Recommended data-driven decision making process - work process management 
As a continuous study of chapter 5.2.3, work process management could be arranged. In this 
case, the discussion will be mainly about the decision making  process before maintenance 
work is sent to IPC for work order arrangement. Decisions, Data architecture and risk based 
failure analysis could be integrated together to help making maintenance decisions (Liyanage 
2003). According to Liyanage, decisions are advised to be made based on solid data and risk-
based failure analysis. A specific data-to-decision interface needs to be designed based on 
concepts of enterprise integration and interoperability (discussed in 2.4.1). Problems 
encountered during decision-making process could also adversely provide some improvement 
suggestions on data management. The flow of decision making could be shown as below in Figure!50.  
 
Figure'50'Decision'making'flow'(Adapted'from'Liyanage,'2003)'
In this case, for maintenance notifications of drawworks from either onshore or offshore, a 
data-driven work process combining decision support system will be illustrated, shown in Figure!51. The work process will mainly focus on the reporting and registering maintenance 
notifications of drawworks. Notifications from either onshore or offshore need to be 
evaluated and reported properly to IPC for further arrangement. IPC will arrange the work list 
according to predefined (by decision-maker) resources needed, required end date, and priority. 
The reporting system and decision-making requirements are suggested to be redesigned with 
consideration of risk criticality and CM data. Unlike traditional sources of maintenance 
needs, the utilization of CM techniques on DW give onshore engineers a chance to discover 
maintenance needs before offshore technicians even.  
5.2.4.1 Recommended,flow,of,decision,making,on,various,sources,of,maintenance,
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The availability of onshore engineer observation combined with offshore engineers’ 
inspection makes the discovery of early failure easier. If notifications come from offshore, 
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better at operation and facility adjustment instead  of making strategic choices. If the work 
could be done by offshore O&M team without assistance from onshore, the corresponding 
work order and required end date could be defined (with priority and required end date) and 
registered in SAP system, so that IPC could use it for further work order arrangement. If the 
offshore team still needs some material or staff to assist the maintenance work, the 
notification will be sent to facility team for arrangement of these resources, and the 
notifications will be sent to IPC by facility team. In some cases, the maintenance decisions 
might have wider influence on cost efficiency and technical safety, which might be out of 
competency of offshore O&M team. For these complex and risk critical cases, maintenance 
notifications need to be reviewed by facility team. Facility team will evaluate alternative and 
cost-efficient solutions, and implement risk analysis based on recommended decision support 
system (chapter 5.2.3). Work order could be registered in SAP for IPC to arrange if risk 
criticality could be handled in this stage. Sometimes problems might be too complex for 
facility team to decide, notifications will be sent to corresponding discipline 
engineers/facility engineers/technical safety for further technical assessment. The team/man 
in charge is supposed to be authority of knowledge and experience. Risk-based failure 
analysis and necessary data are still needed and will work as the basis of decision-making. 
This is described in chapter 5.2.2. Alternative solutions will be assessed in order to improve 
cost efficiency and reliability. Work order will then be register in SAP, with priority and 
required end data clearly defined.  
IPC is the team that will arrange the work list of maintenance notifications registered in SAP. 
The work list is planed based on some planning tools, and priority and required end date, 
which are predefined by corresponding decision-makers. IPC will create work packages that 
could meet the maintenance requirements, achieve efficient logistics and minimize 
downtime. Materials and engineers are preferred to be called out per work order right ahead 
of planned startup of the work.  
The discussion above is the feedforward flow of the maintenance decision making process. 
Feedbacks are necessary and recommended to help build a continuous improving decision 
making process. After work list is set by IPC, execution of maintenance work will be 
implemented by offshore O&M team. Sometimes, for example, the efficiency of logistic 
might be achieved by IPC, but the offshore installation is not capable of storing all stuff 
transported there. Something has to be sent back to onshore due to storage or loading 
capacity. Engineers/supervisors in IPC are advised to have knowledge/competence of 
offshore design and operation. Such kind of feedbacks to IPC could help improve the quality 
of work list next time. IPC will mainly use SAP as the basis to plan work list. Coordination 
and discussion between notification registers (sources of maintenance notifications) are 
necessary. The possible overlapping of priority or data will happen now and then. And 
availability of technicians and competences offshore need to be confirmed before work list is 
made. This helps to achieve a more practical and reliable work list. 
Assignments/responsibilities should be put on those who have full competence to deal with 
work inside his/her position description, and also have knowledge of business strategy (if 
he/she is in engineering discipline) and risk criticality. Competence management is such an 
important part that lack of full competency might bring a risk of failure when facing 
emergent situations. Training on the technical knowledge of drawworks as well as other 
critical systems will be of great benefit to every decision-making levels. Meanwhile, 
engineers are advised to learn and keep in heart of business strategies to keep motivated and 
achieve continuous success. This is a continuous process, where feedback from each side will 
just improve the understanding of the whole picture better and better. 
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5.2.4.2 Suggested,practices,of,decision,making,
The green diamond blocks in Figure! 51 suggest that any decision made in this point is 
recommended to be data-dependent. The data are from CM data diagnose analysis, MPN and 
Birnbaum’s importance measure on all critical components. The quality and availability of 
data is guaranteed by the data architecture described in chapter 5.2.2. The data should be easy 
to read and understand. Any level of decision-makers could make use of it and is advised to 
do so. Original equipment manufacturer is normally recommended to be the technical expert 
on maintaining relative equipment.  
Normally, only consequence criticality is discussed during decision-making process. For the 
concerning of costly offshore operation and maintenance activities, the availability of time 
needs to be taken into consideration in work process design. Fast decision-making should be 
possible when time is too limited (according to FTA and FMSA) to implement normal 
reporting system. For less critical failures (with less critical consequence on the whole 
system), decisions on maintenance could be made by offshore teams. When some critical 
failures comes with limited availability of time, a breakthrough of traditional decision-
making structure is needed for sake of economic and production contiguity concerning. 
Offshore technical teams should be able and allowed to implement mitigation measures by 
reporting to managements who have the right to make decision on maintenance activates 
instead of reporting the needs from one level to another. The crossover of reporting system 
should be allowed in case of emergencies. To make this possible, every management should 
be competent of both business strategy and critical technical concerns. Competence 
management is an another important aspect in context of technical integrity scope. 
To ensure the maximum achievement of technical integrity, ICT system and HMI needs to be 
designed with fast response and availability. Communications between direct reporting 
stakeholders are especially important and should be done in a regular and thorough way. The 
flow of data should be reliable, understandable, relative, and efficient. Basically, the system 
itself should be designed and built with robustness, redundancy, fail-safe and self detected. 
The interface for data-to-decision management is especially important. It could be either 
limitation of decision-making efficiency and reliability, or accelerator for increased 
efficiency and reliability.  
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Part 4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
6 Discussion 
In this chapter, the discussion will be implemented on how the thesis is initiated, the scope of 
the thesis, main results from the research, verification of the method, challenges, and 
contributions. The thesis is also a precious learning process for the author as part of the 
master program. Based on the limitation at present, future scope of work is suggested. 
6.1 Scope, results and importance of thesis 
The thesis is brought forward due to the need of incorporating maintenance data into 
decision-making system on maintenance notificaitons from the company. Later on, the thesis 
is widened to suggest some critical inputs of establishing data-driven decision-making 
practice with maintenance notifications. Drawworks is used as the example to elaborate the 
methodology. The recommended data-driven maintenance decision-making practice will be 
discussed under concept of technical integrity management. Data management is the most 
important part of the thesis. Competence management and decision support system will also 
be discussed as part of author’s suggestions.  
The main results from the research include: 
1) The most critical failure modes of drawworks; 
2) Methods to identify which parameter/component should be monitored; 
3) Methods to achieve technical integrity in a systematic and practical way; 
4) Method of combining data management into decision making process in response 
with maintenance notifications of drawworks; 
The author hopes the methodology and results from this research could suggest some fresh 
ideas to the whole O&G industry on decision-making process on maintenance notifications.  
The thesis is oriented from the need of company’s practical need on data utilization. Data 
from both online and offline, history and present, offshore and onshore are a hidden gold 
mine. Valuable information is buried inside. The thesis is trying to suggest a way to collect, 
identify, analyze and make full use of these valuable data. Maintenance related decision-
making is hopefully becoming more reliable with comprehensive and necessary data. The 
thesis also suggest the way to incorporate other technical integrity management elements into 
decision making practice, like competence management, integrated work process planning, 
and decision support system with contextual data. These are all supposed to help bringing in 
a more reliable and cost-efficient decision-making practice. 
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6.2 Methodology verification 
The methodology is described in chapter 1.6 in Figure!52. The general idea is based on the 
identification of the most critical failure modes. This limits the discussion from the total 
drawwork system into a simplified drawwork system. The quality of simplification should be 
ensured by using risk tools as FMSA and FTA, and reliability analysis tool as Birnbaum’s 
importance measure.  
!
Figure'52'Methodology'of'research'
6.2.1 Failure mods identifications  
There are several methods to identify failure modes of system, like HAZID, FMEA, HAZOP, 
etc. All of them have been widely used by the O&G industry and proved to have the ability to 
increase safety and reliability. They could be used either singularly or in a combined way. In 
this research, FMSA analysis is developed by the author with assistance of company 
engineers. The basis for FMSA is the technical drawing of drawworks. A functional 
breakdown of the system is done before the analysis. The analysis is aimed to be finished in 
component level, which allows the further implementation of CM techniques to monitor 
health condition of critical components. Besides, risk screening from industry practice, 
literature, and company practice are done by the author to reveal the whole risk picture. 
Through the three ways (company practice, literature review, FMSA), it is believed by the 
author that a systematic failure modes identification work is properly done. 
6.2.2 Fault tree analysis 
Fault tree analysis is a critical part in the whole methodology. It provides the basis for data 
management and works as reference of decision support system. It is implemented both in 
qualitative and quantitative way on the drawwork system. Failure propagation is developed 
through FTA, and this could be used for operators, engineers and management teams to refer 
to when decisions need to be made. Training could be arranged around the FTA and FMSA 
analysis to get a general risk picture for each management intervention.  
FTA could be a basis for data architecture establishment. On the one hand, by assigning 
probabilities to basic events in FTA, reliability in component level could be calculated by 
using Birnbaum’s importance measure method. This gives quantitative indications on how 
possible the component’s failure might induce system failure. This adds more value to 
decision support system too. On the other hand, critical data sources could be identified 
through the FTA and relative quantitative reliability calculation. Data diagnose system make 
the data scatter plot readable and understandable. Data could be prepared in a more flexible 
and reasonable way. Specific decision-making stakeholder could thus get a chance to mix use 
FTA and necessary/right data, and assess maintenance needs in a robust and reliable way. 
With the FTA for the overall drawwork system, contextual data identified from FTA and 
collected from CM techniques could be combined into the data architecture, which works as 
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the basis of decision making. A data-driven decision support system could be available to 
use, which is believed to have the ability to improve decision reliability and operation 
efficiency. 
6.3 Contributions 
The thesis tries to incorporate wider TIM concepts into maintenance decision making 
process. Data management is widened through the utilization of contextual data from CM, 
data sets from FTA, reliability data from Birnbaum’s importance measure (see chapter 5.2.2, 
data architecture) and others as shown in Figure!47. Decision support system is incorporated 
with reliability data of failure as well as contextual data from CM. Wider competence other 
than qualification of position is also taken into consideration in case of emergency 
preparedness.  
Data-driven decision making system includes two levels of management. Firstly, IPC needs 
to plan priorities and allocate responsibilities to corresponding disciplines. The process itself 
is data-dependent, and is designed with continuous improvement by feedbacks from 
execution process. Secondly, contextual data from CM, qualitative risk picture and 
quantitative reliability data together make the decision support system more robust and 
reliable. The data architecture allows decentralization of decision-making structure and build 
up a boundary-less organization. By saying so, competence management is combined into the 
maintenance management as well. This is explained in chapter 2.4.4 and chapter 5.2.2 
already. For different failure and consequence, decisions are designed to be assigned to 
different levels of management through the use of criticality and reliability analysis (FTA, 
Birnbaum’s measure). This is more appreciated in case of emergencies. Clearly defined 
decision support system with multi levels of data available ensures the efficiency and 
reliability of maintenance management. 
Besides planned preventive maintenance activates, maintenance needs/changes once mainly 
come from offshore field, where only offshore operators/supervisors could do the observation 
work. The utilization of online condition monitoring techniques makes it possible for onshore 
engineers to contribute to maintenance notification feeds. Data from CM techniques is 
processed by onshore department and signals of failures could be told from diagnosis. Once 
maintenance needs are assessed, priority defined, and required end data set, it is the job of 
IPC to plan the priority of work according to these parameters. Feedbacks from execution 
process also add input to decision makers to keep continuous improvement of decision-
making. 
The suggested data-driven decision making practice on maintenance notifications also allows 
fast decision-making. Competence of decision-making stakeholders needs to be obtained to 
take the responsibility. The availability of time needs to be confirmed, causes and 
consequences of potential failure needs to be clarified, and safety insurance could be 
achieved. A simplified reporting system allows the decision-making process to be time 
efficient in emergent conditions. 
6.4 Challenges 
The author majors in Offshore Technology with specialization of industrial asset 
management. The scope of the thesis is largely covered by the study plan of the master 
program. However, there are some challenges showing up during the research. Maintenance 
management principles from literature view, company view and third party view need to be 
studied to get a full picture. Availability of time from company and third party is limited 
especially third party consultancy company, so that it requires a good understanding of 
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industry default maintenance principles on equipment the author chosed before any interview 
is made.  
Drawworks is set as the example to illustrate the decision-making process on maintenance 
notificaitons. The author had very limited knowledge on the hoisting system. The structure, 
failure modes, failure histories, and current and practical maintenance practices need to be 
studied in a thorough manner before everything is started. 
As industry is moving to an era with great appreciation of data/information. How to identify 
valuable data and find a way to use this data could be a great challenge. The decision-making 
system should be designed with the ability of incorporating data management into the 
process. Reversely, the decision-making process should also allow decision-makers to access 
the data at the right place, and give feedback to upper sources of maintenance notifications to 
keep continuous improvement. 
6.5 Learning 
The thesis has been an exciting journey for the author to utilize, organize the knowledge the 
author has learnt during the whole master program on offshore technology, from decision 
engineering, risk management, condition monitoring, reliability analysis, to human factors. 
And some parts of knowledge fields are deepened and widened due to the quality 
requirement of the thesis. The utilization of technical integrity management in maintenance 
management structure is the main acknowledgement for the author. A new acknowledge on 
improving reliability on decision-making is also gained.  
During the work of thesis, engineers from the company side have been playing the role of 
technological expert, maintenance manager, and external thesis supervisor. The author 
normally communicates with experts from the company through email, and have a bit more 
than monthly meeting frequency with them. The author got to learn the structure of 
maintenance management in the company, responsibilities from each stakeholder in 
maintenance activities and industry practices. The principle of how to define priorities and 
make decisions on maintenance needs is also learnt during the journey. These all become the 
basis for the recommended maintenance decision making practice. 
6.6 Future scope: 
• In the discussion of decision support system, decision-makers will grab relative data from 
data architecture to assist making decisions. As mentioned above, data sources are so 
many and they become so massive. The way company treats data is not updated along 
with utilization of new technologies. A clear data-to-decision interface is needed. How to 
process data to make it understandable and readable for each decision-making stakeholder 
could be a future scope of work. This is mainly about data modeling and interpretation.  
• Fault tree analysis could be done in a quantitative way with failure probabilities assigned 
to each level of FT. Probability of occurrence of top event can be calculated accordingly. 
• Reliability analysis with Birnbaum’s importance measure could be done on overall 
system level to reveal the importance (to the system) of each component. To do this, 
reliability of each basic event in fault tree need be assigned according to experience, 
failure history or industry database. RiskSpectrum or other FTA tools could be used to 
calculate Importance measure values in an efficient way to assist decision making.  
• In the thesis, the discussion is about how to implement decision-making practice on 
maintenance notification with consideration of technical integrity. As technical integrity 
management service is on market, the decision-making practice needs to be adapted 
accordingly once this kind of service is purchased by the company. The supplier 
management, and data flow needs to be redesigned to keep its efficiency and reliability. 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of thesis 
The thesis is a four months and a half project based on the master program on offshore 
technology. The initiation of the thesis derives from the need of data management from the 
company. The thesis has benefit a lot from Professor Srividya, Professor Liyanage from the 
university, Panesar, Kumar, and Isaksen from the company, and Sture from DNV-GL as 
input of third part consultant. The work could not have been done without their assistance 
and guidance. 
The thesis has achieved all the goals set in chapter 1: 
1) Better understanding of interrelationship between facility condition (every critical 
parameters) and failure mechanisms; 
2) Increased reliability and reduced risk for offshore operation; 
3) Continuous improvement of maintenance decision-making practice; 
4) Data-driven decision making practice on maintenance notifications; 
The author believes data/information is valuable and will greatly help improve reliability and 
efficiency of decision-making. Some risk analysis, and reliability analysis are implemented to 
give clues of which, how, and why data is collected and processed. Responsibilities of all 
stakeholders during the maintenance decision making are analyzed and extended if necessary 
as part of suggestions. With a specially designed data architecture and data management, data 
got to be used properly during the decision-making procedure.  
The research is finally done as defined in the scope in chapter 1. The author gives some 
suggestions on how to establish data-driven decision-making process on management 
notifications. Drawwork is used as an example to illustrate the methodology. As the method 
is designed for general use, duplication of this method to other equipment or company is 
supposed to be possible. 
7.2 Thesis application 
The thesis is developed through a methodology defined by the author. It is designed to be a 
general methodology and could be used on all critical equipment. As Figure!49 shows, the 
basis for decision support system are failure identification and data management. For failure 
identification, risk analysis tools used in this methodology are all widely accepted tools and 
are easy to implement. The data architecture proposed a structure to process and forward data 
for certain use during decision-making.  
The research keeps its focus on both offshore and onshore decision-making in respond with 
maintenance notifications. The study is mainly about the data-driven decision-making 
practice on maintenance needs. It could be used as an input and a start of an overall 
maintenance management structure. However, there are many limitations in this study, as 
mentioned in chapter 1.7. Further application of the work should be done with consideration 
of all the limitations in this study. 
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System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Mechanical 
system
Hoist, lower, stop, 
park, hold 
opeartoin
4 4 4 3 194
Supporting 
structures
Support of 
drawworks
Abnormal 
vibration
FTI-Fail to 
function as 
intended
1.2 Vibration
3.3 Maintenance 
error: Looseness 
of fastening blot
Noise None 5 3 3 3 135
Deformation 
of structure
BRD-Breakdown 1.4 Deformation
3.3 Maintenance 
error: Material 
failure, lifting 
weight beyond 
capacity
Structure 
failure
Shutdown of 
production
4 5 3 3 180
Corrosion
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
2.2 Corrosion
3.2 Operation 
error: Chemical 
corrosion,  
longtime 
exposure of salty 
sea water
Decreased 
structure 
strength
Threat of 
shutdown
4 3 4 4 192
Drum
Wrapping on/off 
wire lines
Metallic 
clanking
267
Metallic 
clanking
NOI-Noise 1.5 Looseness
3.2 Operation 
error: Lossness 
of connection
Noise, wearing None 5 3 3 3 135
Fast wearing 
of brake 
discs
LOA-Load drop
1.3 Clearance/ 
alignment 
failure
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Unenough 
braking
Insufficienty 
braking, drop 
of load
4 5 4 4 320
Breakage/ 
buckling of 
drum barrel
STD-Structure 
deficiency
2.5 Breakage
3.1 Off-design 
service: Material 
property change, 
fatigue, or over 
holding weight
Faliure of 
drawworks
Shutdown of 
production
3 5 4 4 240
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Breakage of 
wireline
STD-Structure 
deficiency
2.5 Breakage
3.1 Off-design 
service: Fatigue, 
or over holding 
weight
Possible drop 
of load, faliure 
of drawworks
Drop of load 4 5 4 4 320
Brake power 
is not 
enough
STP-Fail to stop 
on demand
1.5 Looseness
3.2 Operation 
error: 
Disconnection, 
loose items 
Unenough 
braking
Insufficienty 
braking, drop 
of load
4 5 4 4 320
Clutch 
(low and 
high 
clutch)
Transmission of 
power, speed 
shifting
Not enough 
clutch of 
drum
DOP-Delayed 
operation
2.4 Wear
3.2 Operation 
error: Abrasive 
and adhesive 
wear
Delayed 
operation
Reduced 
operation 
efficiency
4 3 4 3 144
Abnormal 
noise
AIR-Abnormal 
instrument 
reading
1.1 Leakage
3.2 Operation 
error: Pneumatic 
system leakage
Noise None 5 3 3 3 135
Metallic 
clanking
NOI-Abnormal 
noise
1.2 Vibration
3.2 Operation 
error: Unstable 
air pressure 
Noise None 5 3 3 3 135
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
2.2 Corrosion
3.2 Operation 
error: Chemical 
corrosion,  
longtime 
exposure of salty 
sea water
Decreased 
structure 
strength
Threat of 
shutdown
4 3 4 4 192
INL-Internal 
leakage
2.7 Overheating
3.1 Off-design 
service: Material 
damage due to 
overheating/burn
ing
Change of 
material might 
lead to failure 
of clutch
None 3 3 4 4 144
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Delayed/ no 
response to 
operation
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
3.1 Control 
failure
3.4 Expected 
wear and tear; 
5.3 Combined 
causes 
Delayed 
operation
Decreased 
operation 
efficiency  
3 4 4 4 192
UST-Spurious 
stop
4.3 No power/ 
voltage
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of 
drawworks
Breakdown 
of production
4 5 3 4 240
Deformation 
of structure
BRD-Breakdown 1.4 Deformation
3.3 Maintenance 
error: Material 
failure
Structure 
failure
Shutdown of 
production
3 5 4 3 180
Chains
Transmission of 
power
Noise
SER-Minor in-
service problems
1.5 Looseness
3.3 Maintenance 
error: The chain 
is not correctely 
tensioned
Low 
transmission 
efficiency
Low hoisting 
/lowing 
efficiency
3 4 3 3 108
Noise
NOI-Abnormal 
noise
5.1 Blockage/ 
plugged
3.3 Maintenance 
error: Not 
enough 
lubrication
Wearing of 
chain
None 5 3 3 3 135
Main 
shafts
Rotating support 
of power 
transmission 
system
Noise
VIB-Vibration, 
NOI-Noise
1.3 Clearance/ 
alignment 
failure
 3.2 Operation 
error: Faulty 
clearance or 
alignment, 
wearing
Vibration None 5 3 3 3 135
Overheat
ELU-External 
leakage-utility 
medium
1.1 Leakage
3.2 Operating 
error: Failure of 
cooling system
Change of 
material 
property
Shutdown of 
production
4 5 4 3 240
Deformation 
of structure
BRD-Breakdown 1.4 Deformation
3.0 General: 
material failure
Structure 
failure
Shutdown of 
production
4 5 3 3 180
Pneumatic 
system
Power of braking 
and speed 
changing
202
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Unusual 
noise
AIR-Abnormal 
instrument 
reading
1.1 Leakage
3.1 Off-design 
service, 3.2 
Operating error
Noise None 5 3 3 3 135
Vibration
VIB-Abnormal 
vibration
6.0 General: 
unstable air 
pressure
3.2 Operating 
error
Noise None 4 3 4 3 144
External 
dew 
formation 
outside of 
pneumatic 
system
Minor in-service 
problems 
6.0 General: 
Temperature 
difference from 
outside 
environment
3.1 Off-design 
service
Dew drop on 
the outer 
surface of 
system
Impact on 
corrosion, 
lubricaion
4 3 4 3 144
Internal dew 
formation in 
pneumatic 
system
Minor in-service 
problems 
6.0 General: 
Temperature 
difference from 
outside 
environment
3.1 Off-design 
service: 
Expansion of 
pressurized air 
lead to sharp 
drop of 
temperature; 
overload;
Dew-induced 
pneumatica 
componenets 
failure
Decreased 
operation 
efficiency  
4 4 4 4 256
Brake 
funcions 
improperly
STP-Fail to stop 
on demand
2.4 Wear
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Unexpected 
braking, fail to 
brake 
Delayed 
drilling, drop 
of load
4 5 4 4 320
Calipers 
responds 
slowly
ELU-External 
leakage-utility 
medium
1.4 Deformation
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Slow 
responding of 
calipers
Delayed 
response of 
braking
4 4 4 3 192
Calipers do 
not respond
ELU-External 
leakage-utility 
medium
1.4 Deformation
3.3 Maintenance 
error
No response of 
calipers
Faliure of 
braking
4 5 4 3 240
Grinding
FRO-Fail to 
rotate
1.5 Looseness
3.2 Operating 
error: improper 
adjustment
Unexpected 
utilization of 
brakes
Unexpected 
braking force
3 4 4 3 144
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
OHE-Over 
heating
2.7 Overheating
3.2 Operating 
error
Change of 
material 
property
None 4 4 3 3 144
Pressurized 
air tank 
failure
AIR-Abnormal 
instrument 
reading
1.1 Leakage
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of 
pneumatic 
system
Stop of 
production 
due to 
automatic 
utilization of 
emergency 
braking
4 5 4 3 240
Wrong 
indication
AIR-Abnormal 
instrument 
reading
1.1 Leakage
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Excessive 
pressure on 
some section 
of pneumatica 
system
None 5 4 4 3 240
Leakage in 
closed space
FTI-Fail to 
function as 
intended
1.4 Deformation
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Faliure of 
pneumatic 
system
Stop of 
production 
due to 
automatic 
utilization of 
emergency 
braking
4 5 4 3 240
No response 
to control 
signal
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
3.1 Control 
failure
3.2 Operating 
error: Short 
circuit, failure of 
electronics/ 
valves
Faliure of 
main braking 
system,  
failure of 
speed change
Stop of 
production 
due to 
automatic 
utilization of 
emergency 
braking
4 5 4 3 240
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
LOO-Low output
5.1 Blockage/ 
plugged
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Failure of 
pneumatic 
system
None, as 
there is 
emergency 
braking 
system
4 3 4 3 144
Mechanica
l brake 
component
s
Braking
Big gap 
between 
brakes discs 
and bands
LOA-Load drop
1.3 Clearance/ 
alignment 
failure
 3.2 Operation 
error: Faulty 
clearance or 
alignment 
Unenough 
braking
Insufficienty 
braking, drop 
of load
4 5 4 3 240
Overheat
INL-Internal 
leakage
2.7 Overheating
3.1 Off-design 
service: Material 
damage due to 
overheating/burn
ing
Change of 
material might 
lead to failure 
of clutch
None 3 5 4 4 240
Delayed/ no 
response to 
operation
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
3.1 Control 
failure
3.4 Expected 
wear and tear; 
5.3 Combined 
causes 
Delayed 
operation
Decreased 
operation 
efficiency  
4 3 4 4 192
Breakage
STD-Structure 
deficiency
2.5 Breakage
3.1 Off-design 
service: Fatigue, 
or over holding 
weight
Possible drop 
of load, faliure 
of drawworks
Drop of load 4 5 4 4 320
Lubricatio
n system
Lubricating 
transmission, 
rotating systems
170
Unenough 
lubrication
FTI-Fail to 
function as 
intended
5.1 Blockage/ 
plugged
3.2 Operating 
error
Wearing None 3 4 4 3 144
Leakage
ELU-External 
leakage-utility 
medium
1.4 Deformation
3.2 Operating 
error
Reduced inner 
pressure
None 4 3 4 3 144
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Insufficient 
flow of 
lubrication 
oil
LOO-Low output
5.1 Blockage/ 
plugged
3.2 Operating 
error
Decreased 
capacity of 
lubricaiotn 
system
None 4 3 4 3 144
Wearing of 
lubricated 
components
STD-Structure 
deficiency
2.4 Wear
3.4 Expected 
wear and tear
Wearing None 3 4 4 3 144
5.2 
Contamination
3.2 Operating 
error
Wearing None 3 4 4 3 144
Change of 
property of 
lubrication 
oil
OHE-Over 
heating
 1.6 Sticking
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Decreased 
ability/ 
unfunctioning 
of lubrication
None 4 4 4 3 192
2.7 Overheating; 
3.1 Off-design 
service
Decreased 
ability/ 
unfunctioning 
of lubrication
None 4 4 4 3 192
Lubrication oil 
pump (no 
redundancy)
Noise
AIR-Abnormal 
instrument 
reading
1.1 Leakage
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of 
pump
None 4 3 4 3 144
Errosion on 
barrel ports 
and port 
plate
BRD-Breakdown 1.2 Vibration
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Failure of 
pump
None 4 3 4 3 144
Pressure 
pulse
ERO-Erratic 
output
1.4 Deformation
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Wearing, 
looseness of 
connection
None 4 3 4 3 144
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
No rise in 
pressure
INL-Internal 
leakage
2.2 Corrosion
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Loss of 
function of 
pumping
Stop of 
production 
due to 
automatic 
utilization of 
emergency 
braking
4 5 4 4 320
Insufficient 
flow of 
lubrication 
oil
LOO-Low output
5.1 Blockage/ 
plugged
3.2 Operating 
error
Decreased 
capacity of 
lubricaiotn 
system
None 4 3 4 3 144
Control of 
lubricaitng system
No response 
to control 
signal
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
3.1 Control 
failure;
3.2 Operating 
error: Short 
circuit, failure of 
electronics/ 
valves
Decreased 
ability/ 
unfunctioning 
of lubrication
None 4 4 4 3 192
3.2 No singal/ 
indicative alarm
3.2 Operating 
error: Short 
circuit, failure of 
electronics/ 
valves
Decreased 
ability/ 
unfunctioning 
of lubrication
None 4 4 4 3 192
Power 
manageme
nt system
Power 
mangement
4 4 4 3 181
Driving 
motors 
(with 
redundanc
y)
Power generation 187
Unusual 
noise
AIR-Abnormal 
instrument 
reading
1.5 Looseness
3.2 Operating 
error
Noise None 4 3 3 3 108
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Vibration of 
motor
VIB-Vibration 1.2 Vibration
3.2 Operating 
error
Looseness of 
connection
None 4 3 3 3 108
Failure of 
one motor
BRD-Breakdown 1.6 Sticking
3.2 Operating 
error: Failure of 
bearing/ shafts
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 4 4 3 192
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
2.7 Overheating
3.1 Off-design 
service
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 4 4 3 192
3.2 Operating 
error: failuer of 
cooling system
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 4 4 3 192
3.2 No signal/ 
indication alarm
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 4 4 3 192
STD-Structural 
defeciency
2.5 Breakage
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
3 4 3 3 108
STP-Fail to stop 
on demand
3.1 Control 
failure
3.2 Operating 
error: Short 
circuit, failure of 
electronics/ 
valves
None None 4 3 4 3 144
3.4 Out of 
adjustment
3.3 Maintenance 
error
None None 4 3 4 3 144
2.4 Wear
3.3 Maintenance 
error
None None 4 3 4 3 144
UST-Spurious 
stop
3.1 Control 
failure
3.2 Operating 
error: Short 
circuit, failure of 
electronics/ 
valves
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 3 4 4 192
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
3.3 Faulty 
signal/ 
indication alarm
3.2 Operating 
error: Short 
circuit, failure of 
electronics/ 
valves
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 3 4 4 192
Leakage in 
closed space
ELU-External 
leakage-Utility 
medium
2.5 Corrosion 
2.6 Fatigue
3.3 Maintenance 
error: Corrosion/ 
fatigue induced 
breakage
Motor runs 
unstably
None 4 3 4 3 144
Unstable 
power 
output
ERO-Erratic 
output
1.3 Clearance/ 
alignment 
failure
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Decreased 
capacity of 
power output
Threat of 
hoisting/ 
lowering 
safety
4 5 4 4 320
4.4 Faulty 
power/ voltage
4.2 Management 
error
Decreased 
capacity of 
power output
Threat of 
hoisting/ 
lowering 
safety
4 5 4 4 320
HIO-High output
3.1 Control 
failure
4.2 Management 
error
Higher   speed 
than expected
Threat of 
hoisting/ 
lowering 
safety
4 5 4 4 320
LOO-Low output
3.1 Control 
failure
4.2 Management 
error
Lower   speed 
than expected
Decreased 
operation 
efficiency  
4 4 4 4 256
Noise NOI-Noise 1.5 Looseness
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Noise None 3 3 4 3 108
High reading 
from 
temperature 
instrument
OHE-Overheating 4.1 Short circuit
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 4 4 3 192
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
2.7 Overheating
3.1 Off-design 
service
Change of 
material 
property
None 4 3 4 3 144
No power/ 
voltage
PDE-Parameter 
deviation
4.1 Short circuit 
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 4 4 3 192
4.2 Open circuit
4.2 Management 
error
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 4 4 3 192
4.5 Earth 
isolation fault
4.2 Management 
error
Failure of one 
motor
None, there 
is redundancy
4 4 4 3 192
Faulty 
power/ 
voltage
SER-Minor in-
service problems
4.4 Faulty 
power/ voltage
3.2 Operating 
error: wrong 
output from 
speed converter
Extra wearing 
due to 
unexpected 
working 
condition
None 4 4 4 3 192
electrical 
component
s
Power 
management 
assistance
Spark
FTF-Failure to 
function on 
demand
4.0 General
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of the 
branch of 
circuit
None, there 
is redundancy
3 4 4 3 144
Overheat
AIR-Abnormal 
instrument 
reading
2.7 Overheating
3.2 Operating 
error
Change of 
material 
property
None 3 3 4 3 108
Breakage
Minor in-service 
problems 
6.1 No cause 
found
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of the 
branch of 
circuit
None, there 
is redundancy
3 4 4 3 144
The 
variable 
speed drive 
system
Varying the 
frequency and 
voltage supplied 
to the electric 
motor
4 4 4 3 204
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Converter
Varying the 
frequency and 
voltage supplied 
to the electric 
motor
Fail to start
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
4.1 Short circuit
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of 
converter
No input to 
motor, trigger 
of emergency 
braking
4 5 4 3 240
4.2 Open circuit
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of 
converter
No input to 
motor, trigger 
of emergency 
braking
4 5 4 3 240
4.0 General
3.2 Operating 
error: failure of 
electronics
Failure of 
converter
No input to 
motor, trigger 
of emergency 
braking
4 5 4 3 240
Failure to 
convert 
frequency 
and voltage 
as needed
ERO-Erratic 
output
4.4 Faulty 
power/ voltage
4.2 Management 
error
Extra wearing 
due to 
unexpected 
working 
condition
Decreased 
operation 
efficiency  
4 4 4 3 192
Power unit
Power input and 
power output
Unstable 
power flow
AIR-Abnormal 
instrument 
reading
3.1 Control 
failure
4.2 Management 
error
Extra wearing 
due to 
unexpected 
working 
condition
None 4 4 4 3 192
Cooling 
system
Cooling of 
converter
Overheat
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
1.4 Deformation
3.2 Operation 
error: Failure of 
cooling fan
Overheat of 
converter
None 4 3 4 3 144
Operator 
interface
Human-machine 
interface for 
adjusting the 
speed
Failure to 
response
FTF-Failure to 
function on 
demand
3.1 Control 
failure
3.2 Operating 
error
Loss of control 
of motor speed
None 4 3 4 3 144
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Loss of 
critical 
signals sent 
to and from 
the VSDS
DOP-Delayed 
operation
3.2 No signal/ 
indication alarm
4.2 Management 
error
Fail to respond 
to emergencies
Unpredicted 
incidents on 
safety
3 5 4 4 240
Driller's 
control 
system
(Operator's 
control 
chair)
Human-machine 
interface
4 4 4 4 214
 Multi-
Tool 
Control 
Cabinet
Human-machine 
interface
Failure of 
joystick
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
3.2 No signal/ 
indication alarm
3.2 Operating 
error
Loss of 
joystick 
control input
None, there 
is redundancy
4 3 4 3 144
Failure to 
response on 
command
FTF-Failure to 
function on 
demand
3.1 Control 
failure
3.2 Operating 
error
Loss of control 
of drawworks 
drilline/ 
braking system
Drop of load/ 
traveling 
block
4 5 4 4 320
Loss of 
critical 
signals sent 
to and from 
driller's 
control 
system
DOP-Delayed 
operation
3.2 No signal/ 
indication alarm
4.2 Management 
error
Fail to respond 
to emergencies
Drop of load/ 
traveling 
block, 
collision of 
crown block
3 5 4 4 240
No signal
3.2 Operating 
error: open/ short 
circuit
Fail to respond 
to emergencies
Drop of load/ 
traveling 
block, 
collision of 
crown block
3 5 4 4 240
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Operator 
workstatio
n(s)
Working station 
of driller
Unconfortab
ility
STD-Structural 
defeciency
1.4 Deformation
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Failure of 
chair
None 4 2 4 4 128
DW control 
system
Hoist, lower, stop, 
park, hold 
opeartoin
3 5 4 4 236
Critical 
sensors
Monitoring 
parameter of 
system
Abnormal 
reading from 
sensors
AIR-Abnormal 
instrument 
reading
3.2 No signal/ 
indication alarm
3.2 Operating 
error
Failure of 
instruments
None, fail-
safe mode of 
instruments
3 3 4 4 144
3.3 Faulty 
signal/ 
indication alarm
3.2 Operating 
error
Wrong reading 
from sensors
Threat of 
hoisting/ 
lowering 
safety
3 5 4 4 240
3.4 Out of 
adjustment
3.3 Maintenance 
error
Wrong reading 
from sensors
Threat of 
hoisting/ 
lowering 
safety
3 5 4 4 240
Alarms
Alarm to dangers/ 
improper 
condition
False alarm
SHH-Spurious 
high alarm level
3.3 Faulty 
signal/ 
indication alarm
3.2 Operating 
error
Fail to alarm at 
dangerous 
condition
Exposure to 
dangerous 
conditoin
4 5 4 3 240
SLL-Spurious 
low alarm level
3.3 Faulty 
signal/ 
indication alarm
3.2 Operating 
error
Shutdown of 
drawworks in 
safe conditoin
Increased 
downtime
4 5 4 3 240
Travelling 
block 
position 
reference  
failure
NOO-No output
3.2 No signal/ 
indication alarm
3.2 Operating 
error
Neglection of  
of anti-
collision 
system
Possible 
collision 
without 
visual 
inspection
3 5 4 4 240
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Main 
drawworks 
control 
system 
(PLC)
Functioning of 
drawworks
Switch 
failure
FTF-Failure to 
function on 
demand
3.1 Control 
failure
3.2 Operating 
error: short/ open 
circuit, or earth 
isolation 
problem
Loss of control 
of drawworks 
drilline/ 
braking system
Emergency 
braking 
trigerred 
unexpected 
during 
hoisting/ 
lowering 
operation
4 5 4 4 320
Human-machine 
interface
Failure to 
response on 
command
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
3.2 No signal/ 
indication alarm
3.2 Operating 
error
Loss of 
joystick 
control input
None, there 
is redundancy
4 3 4 3 144
Failure to 
response on 
command
FTF-Failure to 
function on 
demand
3.1 Control 
failure
3.2 Operating 
error
Loss of control 
of drawworks 
drilline/ 
braking system
Drop of load/ 
traveling 
block
4 5 4 4 320
Loss of 
critical 
signals sent 
to and from 
driller's 
control 
system
DOP-Delayed 
operation
3.2 No signal/ 
indication alarm
4.2 Management 
error
Fail to respond 
to emergencies
Drop of load/ 
traveling 
block, 
collision of 
crown block
3 5 4 4 240
No signal
3.2 Operating 
error: open/ short 
circuit
Fail to respond 
to emergencies
Drop of load/ 
traveling 
block, 
collision of 
crown block 
without alarm
3 5 4 4 240
System Sub-system
Fuction or 
process
Failure 
syptoms 
Failure mode 
(ISO 14224)
Failure 
mechanism 
(ISO 14224)
Cause of 
failure (ISO 
14224)
Local 
failure 
effect
System 
failure 
effect
DET SEV DGN PGN
MPN=DET
*SEV*DGN
*PGN
Failure Mode and Syptom Analysis of Drawworks
Emergency 
stop
Automatically 
triggerred 
emergency 
braking system 
when there is no 
pressure/ power
Failure of 
braking
FTS-Fail to start 
on demand
1.4 Deformation
3.3 Maintenance 
error: Wearing of 
brake discs
Failure of 
braking
Drop of load/ 
traveling 
block, 
collision of 
crown block 
4 5 4 3 240
5.0 General: 
incorrect 
operation 
sequence
3.2 Operating 
error: e.g. motor 
hoisting system 
clutched, braking 
holding system 
cannot be 
utilized
Failure of 
braking
Drop of load/ 
traveling 
block, 
collision of 
crown block 
3 5 5 3 225
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